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ABSTRACT
Many have decried the lack of civility in Congress. However, to this point, few
have attempted to isolate individual level explanations for the lack of comity. This
research attempts to rectify this lapse. Through matched pair analysis using quota
sampling with replacement, the significant predictors of uncivil behaviors are isolated in
a Logistic regression. Initially, a sample is established using the New York Times and
Washington Post, 1933-2005, inclusive. This time period begins with the 73rd Congress
and ends with the 109th. Incidents of incivility were catalogued and the details
concerning the individuals involved were gathered. In the end, the research finds several
significant predictors of incivility; tenure, ideological extremism, electoral safety, and
previous state legislative experience are all significantly associated with the likelihood of
engaging in uncivil acts. By isolating the factors that likely contribute to incivility, it may
be possible to make recommendations concerning the recruitment of future candidates;
recommendations that may lead to a more productive legislature.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
When discussing this research with people who are only casual observers of
congressional politics, the response is both predictable and a bit disconcerting. When it
comes up in conversation that the research centers on congressional civility, the response
is, almost without fail, “there’s no such thing.” Having spent considerable time reading
about the Senate as a gentleman’s club where civility norms reign (Matthews 1960) and
the careful socialization that takes place when one enters into congressional service
(Asher 1973), This dim view that most Americans take of their legislature is a bit
surprsing. It has become a platitude that Americans hate Congress, but love their
representatives (Fenno 1977). While ill feelings toward Congress are hardly a new
phenomenon, it seems to have become more pronounced in recent years. Recently, a
Harris Poll found that a full three-quarter of Americans rate the performance of Congress
negatively. 1
When one turns on C-Span, what one expects to see and what one may witness
can vary greatly. One may imagine a grey-at-the-temples Ivy-Leaguer standing on a
podium, a few scribbled notes upon the lectern. He speaks with confidence, debating
with colleagues the minutiae of the issue currently under consideration. Obligingly, he
yields to “The Gentleman from Connecticut,” who notices a minor difference between
their positions, and wants clarification. With almost painful courtesy, he concedes that
their views do not reconcile completely, but feels that his version of the amendment is the
superior one. He then enumerates a few reasons for this opinion. He yields the balance
of his time for questions, of which there are several. All, even those from the opposition,
are handled with this same gentility and quiet dignity.
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Yes, this passage is entirely made up. However, this is the sort of collegial
atmosphere one imagines in Congress. Indeed, there are some members for whom this
description would be appropriate. However, keen observers of congressional politics can
easily recall many examples of less-than-stellar behavior from our elected officials.
These may range from rude comments and personal attacks on the floor of the chamber to
threats to the health of the First Family should they visit a member’s home state. 2
Some may read these statements and acknowledge that they are true, but say, in
response, “So what?” In short, why should we care whether Congress is civil when it
goes about our business? After all, it is the job of the legislature to write our laws, not
provide the model of behavior that our society should follow. For that matter, is not a
small amount of incivility fitting? After all, some hostility between the ideologically
opposed would seem to be an entirely naturally occurring phenomenon.
Much of the confusion generated by such questions is likely the result of the
multi-faceted nature of legislative conflict. Some argue that there are two types of
conflict in Congress, partisan difference and incivility (Schraufnagel 2006). While a
more complete discussion of this will ensue in Chapter 2, a short answer is provided
below. Scot Schraufnagel (2006) writes:

“Yet another way to distinguish partisan difference from incivility is to consider
the prescriptive implications of each. On a normative level, most scholars
welcome partisan disagreement or inter-party difference over policy. After all,
having parties that compete on the issues is the central requirement of the
responsible party model. It is less clear, however, that incivility in the legislative
arena is a virtue. To argue that there is something to be gained from the lack of
civility in Congress is a much tougher sell. If one occurrence is arguably positive
and the other negative, it must be the case that these are distinct concepts.
Consequently, it would seem important to our understanding of the policy
implications of the legislative conflict to test the relative influence of both forms
of conflict.”
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The research that follows will focus on the type of conflict that Schraufnagel
(2006) argues may be less desirable. That is, this research is not concerned about the
type of conflict that is reflected in partisan disagreement over policy options. Rather, this
work focuses on the personal conflicts that have been a part of legislative processes for
some time. 3 Eric Uslaner (1993) argues that the decline of comity in the modern
Congress is responsible for many of the logjams that are currently a hallmark of many
“do-nothing” Congresses. He suggests that when the individuals who make up Congress
become less willing or able to get along, both the legislative process and the fruits thereof
suffer.
This is more than a trivial matter. The legislative process is at the heart of
democratic governance, and the manner in which a society’s laws and norms are codified.
While one could imagine problems associated with members of a legislature getting too
cozy with one another, it is also the case that surplus conflict can lead to institutional
meltdown. Indeed, some argue that manageable conflict is a vital part of an effective
legislature (Schraufnagel 2006). The key word here, however, is “manageable.” This
research will endeavor to isolate those individuals who move the legislature from
manageable and healthy partisan and civil conflict to the realm of personal discord and
incivility. The assumption is that these individuals are part of the reason for much
current stalemate in Congress.
Research Question

As discussed above, the focus of this research is incivility in Congress, or the
breaking of comity norms such as courtesy and reciprocity that are intended to promote
effective legislative processes. More specifically, this research will separate the civil
4

members from the uncivil in order to tease out the differences in the background
experiences of the more uncivil members. The goal is to define the “type” of individuals
who are most uncivil in an attempt to further understand the prerequisites for a productive
legislature. Surely, some of the negative feelings that people have toward Congress are
tied to gridlock or stalemate, and any effort to more fully understand how to break the
myriad impasses is warranted. In short, the question this research seeks to answer is: are
there definable, systematic differences between legislators who are implicated in uncivil
acts and those who are not? If so, what are these distinguishing qualities? These answers
may provide the keys necessary to promote quality legislative deliberation and output.
All of Congress has not become a collection of foul-mouthed brutes who hurl
insults at each other until they get their way. Members of Congress are members of an
elite body. These individuals are selected by the people of the United States to represent
their interests in the discussions and votes in a variety of policy arenas. They certainly
carry a great responsibility on their shoulders, and are constantly in the public eye. One
might imagine that members would always be on their best behavior. The reality of
legislative processes is that members often lapse into discourteous and insulting
behaviors.
Put again, the central research question is: What sets uncivil members apart from
those who are more collegial? Are they more or less experienced than their civil
counterparts? Are they from certain backgrounds, such as the legal practice or the
military? Are members from certain regions more or less likely to be civil? Is incivility
explained by ideological extremism? Perhaps one’s electoral safety plays a role. It is
with these questions in mind that this project is undertaken. Specifically, 254 legislators
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from 1932 to 2006, who were implicated in newspaper coverage, for acting in an uncivil
manner while serving in their official capacity as a national legislator are identified. This
group is then matched with members from corresponding Congresses that were never
implicated in the same newspapers. This type of matched pair analysis is then
complimented by a Logistic regression analysis that will attempt to isolate those factors
that distinguish the two groups. In the following chapters, the precise manner in which
this test is conducted will be elucidated.
Chapter 2 will review the literature on congressional civility. After establishing
the work in this field, the discussion will move on to examine the literature to justify each
of the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 3 will focus on the specifics of the research
design for this project. As previously mentioned, the project utilizes a random matched
pair (with replacement) sample. Some aspects of quota sampling are also employed to
insure temporal and chamber consistency between the test and control group. The
sampling and data collection methods will be laid out, and sources for secondary data
chronicled. This chapter will also include a lengthy discussion of the control variables
utilized in the research design and the reasons for their inclusion.
Chapter 4 will examine the findings from the project. There are several factors,
such as previous state legislative experience, tenure, ideological extremism, and electoral
margin that are statistically significantly linked to the likelihood of being implicated in
acts of incivility. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a concluding commentary. This will
include the implications, both empirically and normatively, of the findings of the
previous chapter. This will also serve to elaborate the need for future work to follow up
on the findings from this project.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Any discussion of previous work in the field of Congressional civility must begin
with the observation that civility has been waning. Uslaner (1993) argues that civility is
indeed on the decline, and that this is a function of the representative nature of Congress,
and is reflective of a general abandonment of comity in society as a whole. Former
Speaker Sam Rayburn’s notion of “go[ing] along to get along” is no longer widely
observed, neither in Congress nor in society at large.
Defining Incivility

Uslaner’s work, perhaps the seminal work in this area, also makes a strong
normative case for the importance of what he calls comity. Uslaner isolates several
congressional norms: reciprocity, courtesy, specialization, legislative work,
apprenticeship, and institutional patriotism. He argues that comity is made up of
reciprocity and courtesy. Reciprocity is best explained as the presence of deal-making
and keeping one’s word, even when the outcome is undesirable. In short, this is the
Rayburn school of thought; the speaker urged his colleagues to “go along to get along.”
This could be promising a vote on an upcoming bill, helping drum up partisan support, or
any other act one could promise to perform for another. Uslaner notes that while this sort
of back-scratching is often held in a dim view, it is in fact how legislative work is done,
and is vital to the process. Courtesy is treating others with personal respect, refraining
from name calling, and avoiding retribution whether threatened or actual. This is in
keeping with the dictionary definition, “discourteous behavior or treatment,”
(www.dictionary.com).
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While congressional civility inherently includes the latter of the comity norms, the
former (reciprocity) can also be included at times. Certainly, when one member of
Congress calls another a “faggot” (Richard Armey, 28 January, 1995, New York Times,
P.1) on the floor of the chamber during a televised debate, this is a breach of courtesy,
and few would balk at the suggestion that this action is uncivil. However, one could also
be uncivil while breaking the norm of reciprocity. If a senator is in some way angered or
upset by another and places a hold upon the offending senator’s sponsored legislation as a
form of revenge, this would also be considered an uncivil act as defined by this research. 4
There is, however, another argument to be made. Schraufnagel (2006) divides
this lack of comity into partisan conflict and personal conflict, calling the latter incivility.
In this model, the name-calling incident above would certainly be included as an instance
of incivility. The latter instance, however, featuring a senator placing a hold on another
lawmaker’s piece of legislation, might or might not be classified the same way,
depending on the surrounding circumstances. Schraufnagel (2006) uses media reporting
and almanac entries to operationalize levels of incivility.
Which definition works here? As noted in more detail later, this research uses a
collection of media reports similar to Schraufnagel’s as a source for the data of this
project. One would think that this would necessitate the use of Schraufnagel’s definitions
and classifications of incivility. While in the collection stages, this is probably a fair
statement, several instances exist where individuals held issues hostage, engaged in
filibusters, and otherwise held up legislative progress, and these were uncovered with the
list of search terms designed to uncover personal conflicts. Indeed, a reading of these
articles suggests that there is often a personal element to the event. As such, though this
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work focuses on personal conflict, partisan and ideological disagreements will also be
included in the sample, as long as they include a strong element of personal conflict, as
well. In other words, when deciding whether an incident qualifies, this research judges
the uncivil nature of the act irrespective of whether there may be substantive policy
differences underlying the confrontation. Hence, this listing of civil acts is more
inclusive or events will be given the benefit of the doubt, or perhaps more accurately,
uncivil actors will be denied the same.
Recruitment

The issue of recruitment is pertinent to this research. If one is able to ascertain
the background characteristics most likely to produce uncivil legislators then establishing
guidelines for the formation of a more civil legislature becomes a recruitment question.
How can we find and retain legislators most inclined to behave in a manner conducive to
effective legislative processes? Individuals who run for office do not do so in a vacuum.
The Party definitely has a role in selecting its candidates, and it is in the Party’s best
interest to select the strongest-possible candidates (Black and Black 2002, Lublin 2004).
This practice, selecting candidates, is known in congressional scholarship as
“recruitment” and there is a vast literature that addresses this subject.
The substantive literature on recruitment breaks down into three basic areas: The
electoral environment, the candidate’s calculus for entering the race, and the Party’s
actions in attracting the candidate. Throughout the literature on recruitment a common
assumption made is that when deciding whether or not to run for office, potential
candidates will weigh the risks against the rewards and choose accordingly, adhering to a
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traditional rational choice approach to decision making (Maisel and Stone 1997,
Moncrief 1999).
With that understanding, let us examine the impact of the electoral environment
on recruiting. The single largest influence on an individual’s decision to run for
Congress is incumbency. The incumbency advantage has been covered at great length by
academics (Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004; Kazee 1983; Bianco 1984; Mayhew 1974;
Fiorina 1989). Furthermore, it stands to reason that a strong incumbent will deter
challengers and complicate a Party’s efforts to recruit candidates (Stone, Maisel, and
Maestas 2004, Kazee 1983). In order to recruit a candidate, the Party must convince that
individual that there is a significant chance to defeat the incumbent (Kazee 1983). In
short, incumbency is the the single largest consideration in recruiting.
But what about open seats? When there is no incumbent, surely other factors will
come into play. While the following factors are (with one explicit exception) present
even in races with an incumbent, they play a much larger role in open races. First, a
candidate is more likely to run if his Party is strong in the district or state in question
(Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997). This is basically a modern confirmation of Key’s
Law (Key 1947) from roughly a half century prior. 5 Furthermore, in the current
legislative environment, Congress has become a professional body not only on the
national level, but also the state level, making the decision to run rational only for those
with an interest in becoming professional legislators (Moncrief 1999). Finally, in seats
with an incumbent, retrospective voting is a major part of an actor’s candidacy, as a poor
economy impacts an incumbent’s chances for reelection negatively (Bianco 1984). This
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decision, however, is made early in the year, so a lagged effect often exists (Wilcox
1987).
With this understanding of the environment in which an individual decides to run
for Congress, we can turn our examination to the individual him or herself. While the
Constitution lays out few restrictions for service in Congress (age, citizenship, residence),
the reality is far different. The typical member of Congress is of higher socioeconomic
status, is more strongly partisan, has some previous experience in public office, and is
highly ambitious (Fowler 1996; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997). It is mainly the
second and third of these that are of importance to us, as there is no real way to measure
ambition, and the socioeconomic status of strong candidates is unlikely to change. 6 In
1992, 72% of incoming freshmen had previous experience in public office; in 1994, with
animosity toward incumbents at an all-time high, that number was still a majority at 55%
(Fowler 1996). Similar benefits are gained from previous work on a congressional staff;
combining these experiences can make for the strongest candidates (Herrnson 1994). 7
As alluded to, when scholars examine the actions of potential candidates the
rational choice model is commonly used. The role of partisanship also cannot be
ignored; candidates (successful or otherwise) are more partisan now than they have been
in the past (Fowler 1996, Kazee and Thornberry 1990). These partisans make strong
candidates in part because they better understand the financial and personal demands of
campaigning, and posses the skills necessary to address those costs with the least effort
(Kazee and Thornberry 1990). This could be a function of greater competition for seats,
however. Chong Lim Kim (1974) finds that legislators who are not confident in
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reelection are the ones that adhere to the Party line most closely. Conversely, candidates
with a strong personal appeal may be less reliable ideologically (Ishayama 2000). 8
So far, we have a strong understanding of who runs for Congress and the
environments conducive to that candidacy. However, there is a problem. Strong
candidates already have a position, and have something to lose by running for a higher
office, which a random citizen may not (Kazee 1983). How, then, can the Party attract
the best candidates when they have the most to lose in an unsuccessful bid?
First, we must understand that parties do indeed actively recruit candidates.
Thomas Kazee and Mary Thornberry found that over 60 percent of members of Congress
acknowledge a significant recruiting function of their party (1990). 9 Sometimes this
simply means encouraging an individual to run (Herrnson 1986). Sometimes, however,
this is the endorsement of one candidate over the others in a party primary. The
endorsement of party brass is an obvious advantage to any candidate in an election held
only among the party faithful, and this advantage is born out in congressional primaries
(Kunkel 1988).
Furthermore, the two parties can achieve this in different ways (Herrnson 1986;
Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert, 1997). Joseph Kunkel studied Democratic primaries in
Minnesota and found that the Party brass will often implicitly select a preferred candidate
during the primary, expressing preferences within the party. Paul Herrnson (1986) finds
that the Republican Party organizations tend to make contributions of cash and in-kind
donations to preferred candidates, sometimes including the services of a field director,
who works alongside the candidate’s campaign manager, and is often every bit as
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instrumental in the campaign. The net effect is that, regardless of the method, the
blessing of the Party is likely to get a candidate through the primary.
However, here we must note a slight distinction. The parties are technically not
recruiting in all of these instances. Rather, in instances where individuals have already
decided whether or not to run, the Party is actually choosing a preferred candidate from a
list of potential ones. Recall that frequently, congressional candidates are already state
legislators or other officials. This means that recruitment at the national level is often
preceded by a more literal recruitment at a lower level within the Party (Moncrief 1999).
Here the recruiting function of the party has two functions, with a blurred line in
between. On one hand, the Party selects its congressional candidates from a list of
previously recruited members of state legislatures. On the other, the Party is more
actively recruiting those same legislators a few years prior to their run for state office.
Tying the issue of recruitment back to the issue of incivility, if the parties are,
either directly or indirectly, selecting the candidates for congressional seats, then the
parties will be selecting the individuals who may be predisposed to engaging in acts of
incivility or predisposed to honor norms of courtesy and reciprocity. If acts of incivility
have increased in number in recent years as Uslaner (1993) suggests, it stands to reason
that something may have changed about the way parties choose the individuals who are
serving in Congress. Identifying, traits or background characteristics associated with
incivility is a logical first step in trying to unravel the nature of the change and ultimately
the consequences.
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Factors Affecting Incivility

It is the goal of this work to unearth trends and tendencies in recruitment, which
may underlie the move toward a less civil Congress. What follows is a list of possible
explanations found in existing in literature. In the end, this research will suggest a more
complete list of potential variables that may influence the likelihood that someone is
implicated in an uncivil act by one of the two leading newspapers. At this stage it is
possible to lay the groundwork for this work by simply discussing four variables that
have been mentioned in previous literature on the topic.
One of the first questions to come up in such a discussion is that of regional
differences. There are two conflicting stereotypes that are of particular interest, and they
are often noted within the same works. John Shelton Reed (1993) notes, perhaps
paradoxically, that the South is the most violent region in the country, whether one
measures this through crime rates, survey data, or simply his own observations. But there
is also the norm of the Southern gentleman, who is almost painfully polite at all times, a
norm that the author also says is born out in his daily interactions with Americans living
in the South. 10 Indeed, at the risk of spoiling the plot, several of the most often-noted
members in Appendix A to this work, which lists every uncivil incident reported in either
the New York Times or Washington Post (1933-2005), are from the eleven states of the
old Confederacy. If Uslaner’s (1993) argument concerning the representative nature of
Congress is accurate, region must definitely be considered.
The next factor one must consider is margin of victory. Intuitively, it makes sense
that those who have nothing to fear in the upcoming election will be less likely to restrain
themselves. However, Fiorina suggests (1989) that even those who are currently in safe
districts often have occasional “scares” at election time, races that are uncomfortably
15

close. Fiorina sets the benchmark of 60 percent of the two-candidate vote as a “safe”
district. David Mayhew (1974) points out that one of the major motives of anyone
currently serving in Congress will be job security, and it is irrational to do anything that
calls that security into question. 11 Nonetheless, one must imagine that less safe legislators
will be more inclined to mind their manners.
Beyond region and electoral safety, consider for a moment the issues of age and
tenure. Most members of Congress, and indeed most candidates, are comfortably past the
constitutionally-mandated ages for their positions (Fowler 1996). Furthermore, there is
little opportunity for freshman senators or representatives to cause too much trouble
simply because they lack the power and influence to muck things up as significantly as
their more-experienced colleagues, a function of the norms concerning seniority that
permeate both chambers of Congress 12 (Asher 1973; Evans and Lipinski 2005). Also,
more experienced members of Congress are generally more visible, meaning that their
uncivil acts are likewise more visible. This must be taken into account, as the data for
this research comes from newspaper accounts of acts of incivility.
It is now time to address a more complete listing of possible independent
variables that might be relevant predictors of newspaper coverage of acts of incivility.
The research design that follows will also fully elaborate all the methods employed in this
exploration of uncivil behavior by members of Congress.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN
With an understanding of the literature up to this point on incivility in Congress, it
is now time to lay out the specific methods employed for this research. The first problem
is finding data for this sort of venture. Drawing on Schraufnagel’s (2006) media-based
method of measurement provides a solution to this problem. The author uses reports of
acts of incivility from the Washington Post and New York Times from the time period of
interest to obtain a sample:

After settling on these three words [comity, civility, and rancor], an online search
of the full text of the Washington Post from 1977 to 2000 and the New York Times
from 1981 to 2000 was conducted. All articles that use the word “Congress” and
any of the three words “comity”, “civility”, and “rancor” were retrieved…. Each
story was read to determine whether it was, in fact, describing a state of acrimony
in the legislative branch (Schraufnagel 2006, 219).
Schraufnagel’s method is designed to count the number of instances of incivility
in a given year, measuring the level of incivility and its fluctuation from year to year.
This project, however, has a different aim, and therefore a different unit of analysis, the
individual implicated in an act of incivility. A similar search was performed, spanning
from 1933 to 2005 in both the New York Times and the Washington Post. The sample
includes everyone who was implicated in either a New York Times or Washington Post
article, retrieved in the same manner as Schraufnagel, provided he or she was implicated
while serving in their official capacity as a legislator in Washington, DC. 13
Note that this means an article could contain the implication of a single member
or multiple members. For example, if a member of Congress (“Member A”) calls a
colleague (“Member B”) an inappropriate name during a speech on January 20th, Member
A is implicated, but the target of the slur, Member B, is not. If on the 23rd, the two
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exchange words (or even blows) because of the earlier squabble, both members are
considered implicated on the 23rd. In this scenario, Member A has been implicated in
acts of incivility on both the 20th and 23rd. Member B is implicated only on the 23rd.
This brings up two important points, both of which warrant further discussion.
First, it is possible for a member to be implicated multiple times. Indeed, the
most oft-implicated members are likely ripe fodder for qualitative work. However, this
project is wholly quantitative in nature. By including multiple implications of a single
individual, that individual (and his personal traits) would be counted multiple times.
Some might argue that this appropriately weights those individuals who are most likely to
engage in uncivil acts. However, those making such an argument would fail to realize
that anyone who engages in such frequent acts of incivility as to make repeated headlines
is almost by definition an outlier. Furthermore, there are many other reasons one might
be implicated multiple times. Consider for a moment Jesse Helms and Huey Long.
These members are implicated twelve times each, which is good for a tie for third place if
the database is sorted by number of mentions. 14
Huey Long, the Kingfish of Louisiana, was constantly embroiled in controversy.
He was a hero to his home state, seen as a stalwart fighter against the increasingly liberal
wing of his own party and preserving the ideology of his own more conservative brand of
the Democratic Party (Key 1947). He intentionally obstructed the Roosevelt
administration, resorted to name-calling multiple times, and was even censured by the
Senate for his behavior. His incivilities even lead others to be less civil, as several
members’ sole mentions are for rebukes of Long. He did all of this in a three year period,
(See Appendix A) his mentions coming in 1933-1935. Put another way, Mr. Long’s time
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in the Senate was relatively short. However, in that short time, he was constantly in the
news, and it was often for quite notable acts of incivility. He single-handedly made the
73rd and 74th Congresses far less civil than they would have been otherwise.
On the other hand, consider Jesse Helms. Jesse Helms was, and is, every bit as
esteemed in his home state as Long. He was also probably roughly as visible as Long
was to the nation as a whole. Finally, both had major fallings-out with the regionally
dominant Democratic Party, though Helms left the party before taking office. 15 While
there are many similarities between these two cases, they are far from identical. It took
Jesse Helms 18 years (1981-1999) to receive as many mentions in the media as Long did
in three (again, see Appendix A for a complete list). The two have twelve mentions a
piece, but the way that they got those mentions is quite different. The same can be said
for the other 252 people mentioned in any of the articles. Weighting Jesse Helms as
heavily as Huey Long seems somehow inappropriate. Trying to weight any other cases
against these two examples would likely be very problematic. It is now prudent to turn to
an extended discussion of the dependent variable.
Dependent Variable and Sample Considerations

Conceptually, the dependent variable in this project is simple: whether or not an
individual was implicated in one of the nation’s two leading newspapers in an act of
incivility while serving in Congress. As the above-example illustrates, however, putting
this variable into practice can be a bit tricky. There are multiple possibilities, which must
be considered.
One means of measurement is to simply create a dummy variable that indicates
whether or not an individual was implicated at all. The draw back to this approach is that
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it does not account for the fact that some legislators are clearly more uncivil than others.
If levels of incivility are uneven, it makes little sense to weigh the efforts of lifelong
statesmen as heavily as those of rabble-rousers who made as much trouble in a less than a
quarter of the time. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any purely objective
option for determining with perfect reliability the extent of incivility. Because of this
difficulty, this research opts to simply count all people implicated as single cases.
As alluded to above, using a single mention to define the dataset of implicated
members of Congress yields a sample of 254. The next step was to determine which
article to count when a member was mentioned multiple times. It is necessary to do this
because in the end each legislator is matched with a member that was never implicated
from their same time period (the same Congress). When members are mentioned more
than two times, and the total number of mentions is an odd number, the temporal median
article is used. For members mentioned an even number of times the median article is
determined by randomly moving back and forth between the two median articles for that
individual legislator. In the same vein, when members are mentioned only twice,
alternating between the first and second mention to preserves a modicum of randomness.
This sample obviously provides no method for weighting the cases but does include an
inclusive list of people implicated in uncivil acts in the two newspapers.
At the risk of belaboring the point regarding the necessity of weighting cases, note
that one might consider the count of the number of mentions as a suitable dependent
variable. Such a decision would mean using a Poisson econometric model, a regression
used when there is a count dependent variable. However, one of the assumptions of the
Poisson model is that one instance of the act in question does not necessarily make the
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next instance more likely. Prima facie, this violation is at best on very thin ice with the
254 individuals who were implicated, as an individual who was implicated nine times is
probably more likely to be implicated again. Since this research uses a matched pair
analysis, pairing each implicated member with a non-implicated member of the same
Congress and chamber, this assumption is wholly violated. Members of the control
group have served for ten years or more in some cases without a single implication in an
act of incivility. 16
In the end, the decision is made to stick with the dummy variable approach, which
measures whether the individual was implicated in an act of incivility or not. The benefit
to this tactic is its improved reliability and simplicity. Determining the individuals who
engaged in visible acts of incivility and contrasting them against members who have not
been implicated in a single act over the course of their careers can be done in a
straightforward manner and in a way that is easy to replicate (an important quality in any
scientific inquiry). Put another way, this research will analyze individuals who engage in
acts of civility, and not instances of incivility in and of themselves.
Control Group

With the questions concerning the dependent variable addressed, it is time to
consider more specific issues regarding the control group in this research. As alluded to
the research employs a matched pair analysis with random quota sampling to gather an
appropriate control group. In theory, the process could have been performed in a single
iteration. However, there were unforeseen issues with each version of the control group,
and in practice, it took three separate attempts to get it right. Examining ea ch iteration of
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the control sample is likely the most convenient way to explain a long and timeconsuming process.
First, a list of random numbers from one to 535 was generated.17 Then, starting
with the 73rd Congress (1933-1935), this list was used to select random members, who
were then “partnered” with individuals who had been implicated in acts of incivility.
Time-sensitive variables (age and tenure) were calculated from the date of implication of
the individual’s “partner.” This is the matched pair portion of the research design.
When the results of this test were examined, however, a problem arose. Far and
away, the most statistically significant indicator of the likelihood of being implicated in
an uncivil act was the chamber in which the member served. Senators were several times
more likely to be implicated than their counterparts in the House. This, of course, is
unlikely to reflect the reality of the situation. Time and time again, scholarly studies and
the resulting literature have pointed to greater civility in the Senate than in the House
(Schickler and Pearson 2005; Sinclair 2005, Evans and Lipinski 2005). It was
determined that the method of establishing the sample was measuring whether a given
member of Congress was implicated in an uncivil act in the Press, not whether that
person is actually more uncivil than his or her colleagues. However, the former is being
used explicitly, as a surrogate for the latter, a proxy measure of incivility. This presents
an unforeseen difficulty. Members of the Upper Chamber are far more visible than
representatives in the Press by the nature of their post; there are fewer of them and they
are elected to longer terms.
To rectify this issue, quota sampling was used. Senators were paired with
senators, representatives with representatives, each within the Congress in question.

22

Many representatives were necessarily removed from the sample and replaced with
senators. This rectified the chamber problem. Perhaps more importantly, it allowed for
the possibility that, holding all else constant, a regression could still uncover some
importance for a variable that tapped the chamber of the individuals implicated. If
Senators are indeed less civil, even after insuring that this is not a fluke of media
coverage, then that will be indicated in the final model, and it will be a truly surprising
and exciting finding, given the conventional wisdom and literature surrounding the
supposedly-collegial senatorial “gentleman’s club.”
With that problem addressed, only one more issue remained. The randomlyselected control group sample included no members from leadership positions. The only
members of leadership included in the sample at all were those who were implicated in
acts of incivility. To address this issue, random quota sampling was again employed.
Each chamber’s leadership group was defined as follows: Majority leaders, minority
leaders, and whips from both chambers and the speaker or president pro tempore, as
appropriate. New names were drawn randomly to find members of the leadership who
had not been implicated in any acts of incivility over the course of his or her career.
When the random drawing (with replacement) uncovered a leader the previous control
member was replaced with the member from the leadership. It took multiple drawings
before a sufficient number of control group members with a leadership background were
found. This provided an opportunity to test the role of leadership, which will become an
important control variable in the final analysis. 18 The manipulation of the “leadership”
variable represents the only significant break from a purely random process for
establishing a control group. The concern over this break in randomness is attenuated by
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virtue of a large sample size. Problems associated with replacing some randomly chosen
members would have been greater had the sample been smaller.
At this point, the sample is set. It is now time to consider at length the variables
used in this research and the sources for the same. A variety of sources, ranging from
congressional biographies, to election archives, to online date calculators were used to
gather the information necessary to complete this project.
Variables and Hypotheses

Each member of Congress in the sample, control or treatment, is coded on several
variables. A codebook can be found in Appendix B that elaborates precisely how each
variable was computed. First, the date and historical data concerning the act of incivility
was recorded. This included the name of the individual(s) implicated (each as a separate
case), the date the act was reported, the paper in which it was reported, and a brief
description of the event. The brief descriptions can be found in Appendix A to this work.
These descriptions were often kept to a few words, unless they were particularly colorful
or interesting. 19
Next, background information was gathered from the Congressional Biography
Website. 20 Birthdays and tenure dates (dates upon which a member of Congress began
his or her first term of service) were gathered, as were several other variables detailed
below. In each case, time variable (age and tenure) use the date of implication as the end
point and are measured in fractions of years, establishes a relevant ratio level variable to
be used in the final regression equation. 21
At this point, it is appropriate to divide all the model’s variables into three groups:
Key Explanatory Variables; Personal Traits; and Controls for Media Bias.
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Key Explanatory Variables

The three key explanatory variables are “electoral margin,” “ideological
extremism”, and “previous state legislative experience.” Electoral margin is measured as
the proportion of the two-candidate vote by which the member of Congress won his seat
in the election immediately previous to their being implicated in an uncivil act. It is
calculated as follows:

(X-Y)/(X+Y)
In this case, “X” is the number of votes the member of Congress won in the
previous election. “Y” is the number of votes received by the second place finisher. In
cases where an individual ran unopposed, this variable is scored 100, as the winner
received 100 percent of the general election vote. In cases where only one major party
was present this variable will instead use the top opposing vote-getter from a third party,
who usually gained a relatively paltry sum. While a member elected with only third party
opposition is safe for practical purposes, this is still different from running truly
unopposed. It is for this reason that terms such as “two-party vote” and “major-party
vote” are explicitly avoided in the discussion of electoral margin, even though they are
frequently used in other literature (Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1989).
This does, however, present one small difficulty. Some senators initially took
office as the result of gubernatorial appointments. While senators were popularly elected
in every corresponding election relevant to this study, some states did (and still do) use
gubernatorial appointment to fill a seat vacated by the death or resignation of a sitting
Senator. At first, it seems prudent to use the individuals’ next election as a surrogate, as
this ought to still reflect relative electoral safety. However, the important point is not
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actual electoral safety, but rather whether a senator perceives they are safe, making this a
sloppy surrogate at best. Furthermore, some of these individuals either never sought a
full term or failed in that endeavor, meaning there is no surrogate measure at all. As
such, these individuals were removed from the control sample, replaced with others for
whom this data was available. This occurred only about a half-dozen times, and again,
because of the large number of cases involved in this project, this does little to impact the
randomness of the sample as a whole.
The next variable to consider is ideological extremism. Schraufnagel (2006)
suggests that ideological conflict can play a part in legislative conflicts. 22 Ideology is
most easily measured through Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s (accessed 2007)
DW-Nominate scores. 23 However, the concept in question is not ideology, but rather
extremism. As such, for every member, the ideology score will be the percentage of that
party’s delegation less aligned with traditional partisan ideology than that member. For
Democrats, this will be the number of members of the party delegation that have a more
conservative (higher, to use the more intuitive term) score. Republicans’ polarization
scores will be calculated based on the number of delegation members having a more
liberal (lower) score. This is the measure that Sarah Binder (2003) has argued is most
appropriate in her work on legislative stalemate. As is the case with the term “two-party
vote,” the term “moderate” is expressly avoided here. Though it may be intuitive to think
in terms of the percentage of individuals more or less moderate than a member of the
sample, this quickly breaks down. The problem lies with Republicans with negative
scores and Democrats with positive scores, of which there are several in each and every
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Congress during the years examined. The term will generally be avoided, simply to
sidestep potential confusion.
The last key explanatory variable is previous state legislative experience. Recall
that the state legislatures are the congressional “farm team” of the Parties (Bond,
Fleisher, and Talbert 1997; Bianco 1984; Fowler 1996; Ishiyama 2000; Maisel and Stone
1997; Moncrief 1999). It stands to reason that those with previous legislative experience
will have a smaller acclimation period than those coming from other governmental roles,
and will transition more easily into the highly reciprocal life of a member of Congress
(Berkman 1993). This will be operationalized as simply the number of years, according
to a member’s congressional biography, that the member served in a state legislature
before beginning service in Washington.
These key explanatory variables combine to provide a fairly strong picture of a
member of Congress who may or may not be implicated in an uncivil act. They tap his or
her electoral safety, ideology, and previous legislative experience. However, this is not a
comprehensive picture of the factors that are likely to influence the probability that a
given member will be implicated in the Press for engaging in an uncivil act. Many more
variables must be considered, including an individual’s background and of course
variables that can control for the nature of media coverage of Congress. Let us turn now
to consider several personal traits.
Personal Traits

For the purposes of this study, the personal traits included will be political party,
region, age, tenure, legal experience, and having served as an officer in the military. Party
is fairly self-explanatory. Republicans were coded 1; Democrats were coded 0. Third-
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Party members were coded as members of the Party they caucused with at the time of
implication. Individuals who changed parties were coded according to party membership
at time of implication. The theoretical expectation in this instance is that Republicans will
be more likely implicated than Democrats because of the differences between the cultures
of their respective parties. The Republican Party has typically identified itself as the
party of the businessman and of small government. As such, Republicans are more
suspicious of the virtues and norms of legislative service (Reichley 2000). Furthermore,
members of the Democratic Party are more likely to seek a career as a legislator (Fiorina
1994)
Region is also measured using a dummy variable. More specifically, legislators
from the 11 states of the Old Confederacy, the South, are coded “1” and all others “0.”
Southerners are often thought to be either exceedingly polite or more prone to fits of
anger, and these expectations can, paradoxically, be found in the same scholarly work
(Reed 2003). These uneven expectations make it difficult to postulate whether this test
will uncover either a positive or a negative relationship. The variable is included because
of the unique transformations the South endured during the period in question. While
certainly partisan realignment gripped the entire country during the times considered in
this study (1933-2005), many argue that this realignment centered mainly on the South
and the realignment of the conservative Democrats in the region (Black and Black2002,
Lublin 2004). One could imagine that such tension could be a unique source of conflict.
As alluded to above, tenure is measured by collecting data on the relevant dates,
and the distance between them is then calculated. Again, the direction of the relationship
between these concerns and the probability of being implicated is not clear. It is already
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established that members of Congress with more seniority are typically in more powerful
positions than their counterparts (Matthews 1960). However, it is also easy to imagine
that those who have spent a longer time in the system are more likely to be accustomed to
its norms (Asher 1973). Put another way, more-senior members of Congress most
certainly have the means to create visible incidents, but may not have the desire to do so.
Less-senior members, while perhaps more than willing to raise a commotion, may not be
able to do so from a practical standpoint, buried in obscure subcommittee meetings and
late-night speeches that are part of the Congressional Record, but rarely make headlines.
Age, on the other hand, seems likely to attenuate the probability of being
implicated. Uslaner (1993) rejects the idea that the influx of new members to Congress
contributes to the decline of comity. However, others refer to the time incoming
members must spend learning norms (Matthews 1960) and the increasing visibility of
newer members (Arnold 2001), a combination that logically leads to greater exposure for
younger members, makes this a worthwhile variable to include in the analysis. It is
suspected that older members will be slightly less likely to be implicated than younger
ones, once tenure is controlled.
The next variables on which to focus are those encompassing professional
background. Lawyers make up a good portion of most Congresses. In fact, some have
suggested that those with a legal background are in some way better prepared for the
difficult, legalese-drenched operation that congressional service favors (Engstrom and
O’Connor 1980, Schlesinger 1957). It is possible that these generalizations may carry
over into questions of civility, allowing those with a legal background to be less
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frustrated with the legislative process. Hence, the expectation is that members with a
legal background will be less likely to be implicated, all else being equal.
Similarly, a military background may influence the probability of being
implicated. Because of the structured environment of military service, it stands to reason
that those who served in leadership positions in the military may well be more civil on
the whole than those who did not (Huntington 1957). This “Officer and a Gentleman”
argument, perhaps, alludes to the strict sense of order that military hierarchy imparts
upon those who participate in it. Service as an officer is expected to be negatively
associated with the likelihood of implication in an uncivil act.
Controls for Media Bias

Finally, it is important to consider the issue of media bias or the possibility that
the media may simply report some legislators’ incivilities more commonly than others.
Several groups of individuals are more visible than members of Congress as a whole.
First and foremost, members of leadership are almost by definition more visible than their
peers. As a result, members of leadership tend to get more coverage than their
counterparts (Cook 1986). Anyone holding a position as speaker of the House, president
pro tempore of the Senate, majority leader, minority leader, or whip of either party is
coded as “1.” All other members of the dataset are scored “0” on this variable and the
expectation is that this test will return a robust positive coefficient in the regression
analysis that follows.
Also, those from political families may be more visible in the media than the rest
of the chamber, if only because of simple name recognition. If this is the case, then it
stands to reason that these individuals may be more likely to be implicated in the media,
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even if they are not actually less civil than their counterparts. As such, this is included as
a control variable with the expectation that it will produce a modest positive relationship
with the dependent variable.
Finally, the Senate is often considered the more elite chamber, and its smaller
membership makes it easier to cover in the mass media. As previously cited, the Senate
is typically thought to be the more civil chamber (Matthews 1960). However, it has also
typically been more thoroughly covered (Cook 1986). As such, chamber is included as a
control variable, with senators and sitting vice-presidents coded “1”, and all others
(representatives and non-voting delegates) coded “0.” Because of quota sampling used in
this study, no hypothesis as to the direction of this variable can be readily offered, though
one is inclined to suspect an insignificant negative relationship.
Table 1 exhibits the range, mean, and standard deviation of each of these
variables included in the models to follow. The ranges and means fall about where one
would guess for this sort of sample. First, consider the Key Explanatory Variables. The
one counterintuitive case may be electoral margin, where the large number of unopposed
members hailing mostly from the Deep South before 1950 or so skews the distribution.
That detail notwithstanding, the sample seems fairly representative of Congress as a
whole. The central tendency is always one of safety, using Fiorina’s (1989) metric of 60
percent. That converts to 20 percent using this study’s metric (60-40/100). The mean,
32.04, easily exceeds this standard. The median (not shown below) value is 22.53, again
exceeding the 20 percent benchmark, though notably closer to it.
Next, consider ideological extremity. Again, the range runs the gamut from the
absolute least-extreme members (0) to the most (.997). The mean score here, .523, is

31

fairly close to the middle of the range. The standard deviation of .305 indicates that
about two-thirds of the sample has a score between .217 and .828. This paints the picture
of an ideologically diverse legislature, with most having at least some adherence to a
Partisan ideology.
Third, there is the issue of previous state legislative experience, measured here in
years. The minimum value of zero is not a surprise. The maximum value of 32 is large,
and is definitely an outlier. Only 176 of the members in the sample have any state
legislative experience at all, setting the median and modal values both at zero, and
indicating that this variable has a strong positive skew.
The first two personal traits, Party and Region, are nominal variables. Party
seems to be split roughly evenly between the two options, with more Democrats than
Republicans. This is consistent with the Democratic majorities that were common in
Congress throughout the time period of the sample. Similarly, the South’s eleven states
account for 24 percent of the sample, where those states are 22% of the current makeup
of the nation. This sample covers more than two generations’ worth of congressional
history. It is also unusually weighted between senators and representatives. Similarly, the
population of the United States has changed a great deal in that time. As such, it is
difficult if not impossible to determine exactly how representative this sample is.
However, given the dominance of the Senate in the sample (remembering that the Senate
is only about one-fourth the size of the House), this number seems roughly appropriate.
Age and Tenure indicate that that average member of Congress is about 56, and
has served about twelve years at the time of implication. The range of ages runs the
gamut from those who are just beyond the age of eligibility at 30.216 (the legal
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minimums are 25 in the House and 30 in the Senate, as defined in Article I of the
Constitution) to those who are approaching the end of biological eligibility (that is to say,
entering their twilight years) at 87.584.
Roughly half of the sample consists of individuals who have spent at least five
years in the legal profession. This is perhaps a bit lower than one would expect, given
the ease with which lawyers may become accustomed to congressional service
(Schlesinger 1957). Similarly, former military officers account for less than 20 percent
of the sample. No hypotheses were put forth as to the frequency of former officers in the
sample, so this is of little consequence.
Among the Controls for Media Bias, the most interesting is Senate membership.
Even though the Senate has only 100 members to the House’s 435, the majority of the
individuals in the sample are Senators. Members of leadership and political families are,
predictably, fairly rare in the sample, as one would suspect they would be in Congress as
a whole.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics:
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act

Key Explanatory Variables
Electoral Margin
Ideologically Polarized
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)

Min. Value

Max. Value

Mean

Stand. Dev.

0.13
0
0

100
.997
32

32.04
.523
2.207

28.829
.305
4.162

0
0
30.216
.058
0
0

1
1
87.584
50.359
1
1

.415
.248
56.345
12.773
.467
.185

.493
.432
10.37
9.692
.499
.389

0
0
0

1
1
1

.083
.098
.587

.276
.298
.493

Personal Traits
Political Party (GOP = 1)
Southerner (former CSA)
Age (yrs.)
Tenure (yrs.)
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)
Military Officer
Controls for Media Bias
Leadership Position
Political Family
Senate Membership
n = 508

All in all, these variables tend to point toward the randomness of the sample.
Among those where a central tendency can be guessed with deduction, there are few
surprises. Electoral margin is significantly skewed, but as other literature indicates, most
members are now in safe districts (Mayhew 1974).
Representativeness of the Sample

Table 2 examines some of the variables as they appear in the control group, as
after all, a representative sample is necessary for any meaningful analysis. Put another
way, before moving on, it is necessary to examine the control group and establish
whether it is, after all, a good control.
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Table 2
Representativeness of the Control Group by Selected Independent Variables
Key Explanatory Variables
Electoral Margin (mean)
Personal Traits
Political Party (% Democrat)
Southerner (% former CSA)
Age (mean in yrs.)
Tenure (mean in yrs.)
Lawyer
Military Officer
Controls for Media Bias
Leadership Position
n = 254

Expected Value

Actual Value

> 20a

26.77

55-60%b
20-25%c
55-60d
10-12d
42.62 % e
25.98%f

57.09 %
23.23%
54.98
10.37
46.85
19.3%

1.86%e

3.15%

a

This expected mean is extrapolated from the fact that a majority of members of Congress from 1950-1990
gained more than 60% of the two-candidate vote in the previous election (Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina
1992).
b
For most of the period in question, the Democrats held a fairly comfortable majority in both chambers.
Because of the nature of this research, extrapolating an exact benchmark is difficult at best.
c
The sample here is mostly Senators. The 11 states of the old Confederacy constitute 22% of the union (50
states), ignoring the years before Alaska and Hawaii were admitted. The concentration of Senators in the
sample mitigates the difficulties presented by the rapid growth of the South during the period in question.
d
At the convening of the 109th Congress, the average age of a senator was 60, and the average age of a
representative was 55. Average length of service was 9.1 years and 12 years in the House and Senate,
respectively.
e
This is the value of 10/535, as leadership includes the Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, and the majority and minority leaders and whips of both champbers. However, members of
leadership were inserted into the sample via random replacement, so the actual value is inflated. Recall that
the original actual value was 0%, as there were no members of leadership originally included in the
sample..
e
Again taken from the Senate’s own statistical survey of the 109th Congress, but only indicating individuals
who hold a law degree, which is slightly different from the metric used in this research, which requires five
years of work in the profession.
f
This value is for members of the 109th who served in the military in some capacity, officer or otherwise.
The Senate site admits that this number is falling because of the lack of a recent draft.

Of the twelve independent variables suggested previously, numbers were only
readily available and useful for these eight. Chamber is not representative at all because
of the use of a quota sample.
First, consider margin. Fiorina’s (1987) metric of 60% of the vote constituting a
“safe” district characterizes over half of Congress (Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina
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1992). Converting this figure to the metric used in this research (60-40/100) yields a
benchmark of 20 percent. The control sample figure is just over 26 percent, which seems
roughly appropriate, allowing for the fact that the mean will by definition be positively
skewed because of the fair number of individuals who ran unopposed (Fiorina 1987,
Mayhew 1974).
The Democratic Party held a majority of seats in both chambers for all but about a
dozen of the sessions in the sample. It is therefore not surprising that Democrats make up
roughly 57 percent of the control group.
Age, tenure, legal expertise, and military service were all taken from the Senate’s
statistical breakdown of the 109th Congress. 24 Age and tenure are well within the
expected ranges. There are, however, more lawyers and fewer military officers than one
might expect. A closer examination of the methods involved in this research, however,
puts these fears at least partially to rest. This research examines individuals who served
as a lawyer or judge for at least five years, those best-equipped to deal with the legalese
of a legislative career. However, Congress is becoming more diverse than it once was
(Fowler 1996). The Senate site alludes to a professional magician, two professional
athletes, a semi-professional musician, a jackaroo (cowboy), three different kinds of
pilots, and several media personalities in the current batch. In short, the number of
lawyers in Congress is declining as individuals continue to run as outsiders, and this is a
case where the statistics thoroughly support Fowler’s (1996) assertions.
The case of military service is best explained by the metrics in use. The only
figure available is for those serving in the military in any capacity. A similar metric,
when applied to this sample, counts 47.2 percent of the sample as veterans of some sort.
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However, as the Senate site states, the number of veterans in Congress has plummeted
recently, as there has been no enlistment due to selective service since 1973. It is
difficult to isolate a central tendency for military service, and numbers directly
comparable to those used in the rest of this research are not readily available.
All in all, the sample seems to be fairly representative of Congress as a whole for
the time period this research examines. The age, tenure, margin of victory, and legal
background of the sample are all roughly what one would anticipate. With the sample
and methods now in place, it is possible to tease out the influences of the various
independent variables upon the likelihood of implication.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
In previous chapters, the established scholarly literature and the methods for this
research have been laid out. The dependent variable is dichotomous and measures
whether someone in the dataset was implicated or not, as such it takes on a value of either
0 or 1, the latter indicating that the individual in question was implicated in one or more
acts of incivility during the time period of this study (1932-2005).
The final model in this research uses Logistic regression. However, first, it may
be prudent to get more acquainted with the data. Recall that this is a matched pair
analysis that uses some aspects of quota sampling to correct for inconsistencies created
by the perfectly random drawing of names for the control group. When names were
drawn that were already a part of the dataset, they were replaced. 25 It will be helpful to
begin by reporting simple correlations, which reveal something about the relationship
between the independent variables of interest and the dependent variable. The major
difference between these correlations and a regression is that regression models measure
the effect of each variable while holding all other variables constant. Correlations,
however, examine each variable with no regard whatsoever for other variables. Table 3
features the correlations with the dependent variable for each of the independent variables
outlined above, along with the hypothesized direction of the relationship. For
dichotomous variables, Cramer’s V is also included. Cramer’s V is a proportional
reduction in error measure of association for dichotomous variables. In this case,
Cramer’s V is essentially the absolute value of Pearson’s r. However, some would argue
that it is technically the more appropriate measure, and as such, it is included here.
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Table 3

Bivariate Correlations:
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act

Key Explanatory Variables
Electoral Margin
Ideologically Polarized
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)

Exp.
Sign
+
+
-

Personal Traits
Political Party (GOP = 1)
Southerner (former CSA)
Age (yrs.)
Tenure (yrs.)
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)
Military Officer

+
+, +, +
-

Pearson r
.183 ***
.068 t
-.084*

-.028 [.028]
.036 [.036]
.132**
.248**
-.004 [004.]
-.02 [.02]

Controls for Media Bias
Leadership Position
+
.186*** [.186***]
Political Family
+
-.013 [.013]
Senate Membership
+
.000 [.000]
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10 (one-tailed test)
Brackets contain Cramer’s V for dichotomous variables; indicators of significance are as
above.
n = 508

Most of the variables perform roughly as expected. The strongest correlations are
found when considering the variables electoral margin, tenure, and holding a leadership
position. Ideological polarization, previous state legislative experience, and age are also
statistically significant. However, several of these findings warrant further comment.
First, consider electoral margin. This is perhaps the least surprising of the
significant variables. Those who do not fear electoral defeat are more likely to do as they
please, even if the things they wish to do are perhaps a bit distasteful to others.
Furthermore, many of those with the highest margins also come from ideologically
homogeneous areas (the Deep South before 1960 is a prime example), where a rational
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actor would not expect to face a serious challenge in any general election. All an
incumbent need do in that environment is not to be so dreadful as to raise significant
opposition in the primaries. Obviously, these candidates have greater leeway than
individuals who routinely win their seats by lower margins.
The next variable is ideological extremism. There have been some tentative
arguments that ideological distance can be a predictor of incivility (Uslaner 1993,
Schraufnagel 2006). 26 The raw correlation tends to bear this out. It is statistically
significant, but weak. This suggests two possibilities. First, the relatively large sample
may be pushing this variable into the realm of significance. Second, it is possible that
this finding supports the suspicion that ideology is, at best, only part of the story.
Previous state legislative experience is significant, and supports the literature on
the ease of adaptation for State legislators as opposed to governors and others making the
change to the life of a member of Congress (Berkman 1993).
Age and tenure both correlate significantly with implication. This makes sense,
but one must wonder whether the two are somehow intertwined. After all, a forty-yearold representative will almost necessarily have less experience than one in his or her
sixties. Logically, it makes sense that multicollinearity might be an issue. The two
correlate with a Pearson’s r of .575. This is low enough that multicollinearity is not an
inherent problem. However, it is high enough to make one wonder what a regression will
uncover.
Finally, consider holding a leadership position. This is a control, included
because of the high visibility of Congressional leaders and the increased likelihood that
they will garner media attention. As expected, the correlation analysis produces a
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positive and significant coefficient. However, the Pearson’s R is again quite small.
Again, a logistic regression will prove illuminating.
These correlations and Cramer’s V statistics give a rough idea of the association
between the various independent variables and the dependent variable. However, as
previously mentioned, each correlation fails to take any other factors into account,
essentially analyzing the two variables in a vacuum. Regression will measure the effect
of each independent variable when all others are held constant. A Logistic regression is
most suitable for a dichotomous dependent variable.
Logistic Regression and Analysis

Below is the Logistic regression result, followed by a table that provides predicted
probabilities. First, a word on predicted probabilities is necessary. Logistic regression
coefficients cannot be read in a manner consistent with those used for Ordinary Least
Squares regressions, and contain no substantive significance of their own. Accordingly,
predicted probabilities, which provide the average probability of moving from being not
implicated to implicated given a pre-determined change in the statistically significant
independent consideration. With that being said, let us turn to the Logistic model first.
Note that these results may or may not be in keeping with those from raw correlations,
because a regression finds the association between a given independent variable and the
dependent variable when all other variables are held constant. All coefficients are listed
with robust standard errors. Those achieving significance in a one-tailed test are marked
accordingly.
Again, a few variables achieve statistical significance. The first surprise is that
ideological polarization is now significant at the p < .05 level, where it was merely at the
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p < .10 level previously. Logistic uncovers a stronger relationship than the correlation
data could find. The fact that this is a positive relationship indicates that the ideologically
extreme are more likely to be implicated in an act of incivility than are moderates. This
is even more strongly the case when other considerations (electoral safety, tenure, etc.)
are held constant.
Again, electoral margin is significant, and again, it is significant at the p < .001
level. This is perhaps the biggest story of the model. Those who do not fear electoral
consequences will do as they wish, where those in more precarious electoral situations
will be more inclined to show restraint. This reinforces the assertions of Mayhew (1973),
Fiorina (1989), and others who claim that as legislatures have become more
professionalized, reelection has become a greater concern.
The third key explanatory variable is state legislative experience. Indeed, those
who have previous state legislative experience are less likely to be implicated in an act of
incivility than are their colleagues with other occupational backgrounds prior to service in
the US Congress. This lends credence to the “farm team” approach to recruitment
mentioned earlier.
These three variables combine to tell a compelling story. First, the parties will
create a more civil chamber if they continue to recruit as they have, finding their
candidates in state legislative offices whenever possible. This is the one of the three, key
explanatory variables that is actually under the control of a party’s political organization.
The other two, ideological extremism and electoral margin, are at the least somewhat
outside of the Party’s control. 27 A rational actor, either as a candidate or as a Party leader,
will actually pursue a higher electoral margin, and it is in the Party’s interest to aid in that
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pursuit. While the Parties could attempt to recruit centrist candidates, there is no explicit
incentive to do so, if the ideologically extreme candidates are winning elections by
comfortable margins.
The rest of the table provides a few more surprises. First, note that age is no
longer significant. However, experience in years becomes a more significant predictor.
This suggests that age is not really a determining factor. Rather, time spent in the system
(“tenure”) appears to do one of two things. It either makes one more frustrated with
legislative process and less willing to “go along to get along” or this finding is yet
another factor that can be attributed to more media visibility.
Among the (other) media control variables included, only leadership achieves
significance. This may partly be due to the rarity of civil leaders in the sample.
However, this finding could possibly indicate that leaders are inherently more likely to be
uncivil. In fact, some have found a similar phenomenon, albeit with causality reversed,
finding that the firebrands of the party are more likely to achieve leadership (Schickler
and Pearson 2005).
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Table 4.
Logistic Regression Analysis:
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act
Coefficients (robust stand. errors)

Key Explanatory Variables
Electoral Margin
Ideologically Polarized
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)

.014 (.004) ***
.583 (.333) *
-.046 (.025) *

Personal Traits
Political Party (GOP = 1)
Southerner (former CSA)
Age (yrs.)
Tenure (yrs.)
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)
Military Officer

.13 (.2)
-.101 (.232)
.003 (.012)
.043 (137) ***
-.007 (.203)
-.012 (.252)

Controls for Media Bias
Leadership Position
Political Family
Senate Membership

1.093 (.425) **
-.256 (.325)
.198 (.213)

Constant
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
n
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10 (one-tailed test)

-1.546
53.77
.089
508

Before going on, note that the R2 in this model is fairly low. This is partly
because of the breadth of the study. It spans 72 years, and obviously much has changed
in that time, both in Congress and in American society. The other reason, or perhaps an
extension of the previous one, is that this project deals with individual-level data, and
attempts to predict individual behavior. Taken together, this is quite a difficult
proposition. A model that predicts incivility in Congress on the individual level as
reliably in 1937 as 2001 is quite a tall order. The difficulties of a large timeframe and
individual-level data tend to exacerbate each other. As such, any explanations at all are a
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step in the right direction. Put another way, this model explains 8.9 percent of the
variation in the dependent variable from 1933 to 2005. While this is far from a
comprehensive explanation, it is still certainly illuminating.
The difficulty with Logistic regressions, mentioned above, is that they do not
provide an intuitively meaningful coefficient. Predicted probabilities are necessary for
that. These are provided in Table 5.

Table 5.
Predicted Probabilities:
Variables found to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act

Key Explanatory Variables
Electoral Margin [1 stand. dev. change]a
Ideological Extremism [1 stand. dev. change]b
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.) [full range 0-32]
Personal Traits
Tenure (yrs.) [1 stand. dev. change]c

Probability
8.4
4.4
-32.5

10.0

Note: Ratio variables held constant at their mean values (see Table 1) and dichotomous variables held
constant at their modal value.
a
Using the full range of the Electoral Margin variable suggests that the probability of being implicated
increases by 33.7% as we move to the smallest to the largest possible margin of victory.
b
Using the full range of the Ideologically Polarized variable suggests that the probability of being
implicated increases by 14.4% as we move from the least to the most ideologically polarized member.
c
Using the full range of the Tenure variable suggests that the probability of being implicated increases by
46.6% moving from the member with the shortest time in office to the member who has been there the
longest.

The four significant variables are shown above with their predicted probabilities.
With the exception of previous legislative experience, the probabilities are given in terms
of single standard deviation change. Examining these predicted probabilities for each of
the variables allows one to make substantive comparisons about the relative importance
of variables across the dataset.
The largest change across a standard deviation is found for the variable Tenure. The
indication is that over time, individual members of Congress, for whatever reason,
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become more likely to be implicated in acts of incivility. This may be due to an increase
in visibility. It may also be due to a mounting frustration with the difficult nature of the
legislative process. It could certainly be some of both, as the two are likely not mutually
exclusive. However, plotting the tenures in years against predicted probabilities shows
that, even though the prevailing trend is in the expected direction, the data is not as
unified as the probability by itself would tend to indicate.
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Figure 1
Predicted Probabilities of Implication in an Act of Incivility by Tenure
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Electoral margin, again, produces a strong relationship with the probability of
implication. A single standard deviation change in the electoral margin produces an 8.4
percent increase in the likelihood of implication, with all other variables held constant at
their mean value for ratio variables and their modal value for dichotomous variables.
This is far and away the most linear of the relationships when graphed. In fact, it is the
only one in which there is not some sort of unexpected bump or hiccup somewhere in the
graph. Prevailing literature suggests that once individuals arrive in Congress, they do not
wish to leave (Mayhew 1974). However, once their job security is assured, there seems
to be less incentive to behave oneself or adhere to civility norms.
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Figure 2
Predicted Probabilities of Implication in an Act of Incivility for Electoral Margin

Ideological extremism also has a positive association with the likelihood of
implication. Now, a one standard deviation change is associated with a 4.4 percent
increase in the probability of being implicated, ceteris paribus. While this indicates that
ideological distance does indeed matter, some may take solace in the fact that other
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factors outweigh the importance of ideological extremism as a predictor of uncivil
behavior. The findings suggest that extremism alone does not predict incivility, and that
by extension it is still possible for one to hold an ideological line and remain civil. In
fact, when graphed, this tendency becomes even less pronounced.
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Figure 3
Predicted Probabilities for Ideological Extremity
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1.00

Finally, considering previous state legislative experience, the predicted negative
associated with implication is obtained. The longer a potential candidate spends getting
accustomed to the demands of the legislative process on the state level, the easier the
transition to the U.S. Senate or House appears to be, at least in terms of following norms
intend to promote comity and a civil legislative process, with which these members are
already innately familiar.
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Figure 4
Predicted Probabilities for State Legislative Experience (in Years)
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This chapter began by exploring the data with simple correlations. Several
significant relationships were uncovered. Then, Logistic regression showed that there are
several significant predictors of uncivil behavior. Finally, predicted probabilities showed
the effects of these independent variables on the likelihood of implication. There is a
story in this data. The factors that are beyond the Parties’ control are, for the most part,
contributing to incivility. The one factor that the Parties they do control, however, and
the one thing that both parties can do when recruiting candidates is look for those with
previous state legislative experience. This variable is one of the factors that act to
preserve civility in the national legislature.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
This research examines questions of congressional civility. Chapter 2 reviewed
the work in this field up to this point, paying particular attention to Uslaner’s argument
concerning the representative nature of Congress. While Uslaner lays out a solid
framework for discussions concerning congressional comity, his arguments do little to
explain who, individually, is responsible for the decline in comity. It is here that this
piece makes its contribution to the literature on legislative conflict.
Having established the need for further exploration of the underlying personal
causes of civility in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 turned to a discussion of methodology. After
considering the possibility of Poisson regression, a Logistic model was settled upon.
Variables are set and the formulae and coding practices examined.
A Logistic regression shows that there are indeed significant predictors of
incivility. Four major predictors are uncovered: tenure, electoral margin, state legislative
experience, and ideological extremism. Predicted probabilities further showed the
substantive relationship between these variables and the dependent variable, implication
in an act of civility. These predicted probabilities provide a rough analog to the intuitive
coefficients derived using Ordinary Least Squares regression.
The proverbial fly in the ointment, however, is the low Pseudo R2 in this model.
On one hand, this research deals with individual behavior over a 72-year period. It is
difficult to imagine that every implication would be predicted correctly. However, one
must wonder what makes the outliers different. The ten most-likely individuals who
were not implicated are John Johnston, Jr., Marion P. Daniel, Sam Rayburn, Lindley
Beckworth, Henry Steagall, John Breaux, Robert Thomas, Beryl Anthony, Spessard
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Holland, John Anderson, and Carl T. Hatch. These individuals have one thing in
common: all of them won their seats without opposition. They are also mostly Southern
Democrats. Eight of the ten are from the South, and nine are Democrats. Indeed the 39
most-likely individuals from the control group had victory margins of over 50 percent.
This is perhaps a significant caveat to the otherwise stunningly significant electoral
margin. It begins to break down a bit when individuals have no opposition whatsoever.
This could be explained by an interaction between region and margin, or perhaps an
additional dummy variable for those who ran without a major-party opponent (several
others who were high on the list were only nominally opposed by a third party).
Moving to those who were likely to be implicated, but were not, a similar
phenomenon can be observed. William Benton, John Tower, Birch Bayh, Newt
Gingrich, Thurston Morton, John Culver, Timothy Wirth, Anthony Beilinson, Brock
Adams, and Paul Trible, Jr. all won their seats by less than 2.5 percent of the twocandidate vote. Gingrich was serving in a leadership role when he was implicated.
However, Gingrich was among the most-implicated individuals in the data set, having
nine mentions. That said, the rest of the “top 10” had only a single mention each. Again,
margin is the major predictor, and the one that is erroneous. Four of these individuals
were from the Old South. The only other variable that stands out is ideological
extremism. The mean of .581 is only about .05 above the mean for the sample as a
whole. However, there are a few individuals in that group (Culver, Adams, Tower, and
Birch) who are quite extreme, all above a .75, meaning that 75 percent of their own party
was more agreeable toward the other party ideologically.
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Future Work

This research begins to answer a very basic question of who is behind the
incivility in Congress. However, it poses several others. Normatively, a more civil
legislature is desirable, assuming that there is still some level of ideological competition,
as prescribed in the responsible Party model of governance. However, does this research
suggest anything that can be done to encourage civility? Let us examine each of the four
variables in turn.
First, consider electoral margin. It would be possible to draw districts in such a
way as to guarantee electoral competition. However, it is not in either Party’s best
interest to surrender its safe seats. In fact, such a practice would run exactly counter to
the stated purpose of a political party, especially if the other party does not do the same.
It does stand to reason, though, that one safe district may not necessarily be like another.
Future work here could further explain which safe districts are more or less likely to
produce members who have been implicated in acts of incivility. Of particular interest
are those districts in which members were running unopposed.
Second, there is the matter of ideological polarization. While the Downsian
notion of centrist candidates competing for the mass of voters at the ideological midpoint
is appealing, it seems that this is not occurring on the congressional level. Future work in
this area could attempt to establish whether this phenomenon systemically contributes to
incivility or whether there are other issues involved. Recall that in this research, the
variable was significant, but graphing the predicted probabilities showed a far less robust
relationship than the numbers originally indicated.
Third, there is state legislative experience. This is the one variable that most
easily lends itself to a prescription for the future. Those who have previous state
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legislative experience contribute to congressional civility, and by extension congressional
effectiveness if Uslaner’s introductory arguments are to be believed. However, this is
already the proverbial “farm team” for both Parties. As such, the only real
recommendation can be to continue that which the parties are already doing, albeit
perhaps in a more focused manner.
The fourth significant variable was tenure. This is perhaps the greatest
opportunity for future work. There are multiple possible explanations as to why this is
the case. It is possible that tenure is significant simply because those who spend years
upon years in Congress simply get frustrated with the difficult processes involved and the
seemingly glacial rate of progress. However, it is also possible that this is merely a
function of the increased visibility that comes with prolonged service. Recall that the
sample is drawn from media reports. The available data therefore cannot realiably
establish which of these possibilities represents reality the best. Of course, the
explanation may be partly both of these things; as the two considerations are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Further work would do well to focus on isolating the
different parts of tenure (visibility, position, and experience come to mind) that may
impact the likelihood of being implicated in an uncivil act.
There is also the possibility that other variables may facilitate a more robust
explanation. A more detailed examination of region, for example, may show that
individuals from another portion of the country are in fact far less civil than even the
rowdiest of Southerners. It is also possible that removing the South’s unopposed
districts, even with a simple dummy variable, could refine the model.
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Furthermore, it is entirely possible that a contrast between urban and rural
districts may be partly to blame for the rise in incivility as of late. This would be
measured simply as the square mileage of the various House districts, since each district
includes the same number of voters.
This research examines the predictors of uncivil behavior in Congress. If there is
one story in the data, it is one that we as a community have heard before. Those with the
least to fear in the next election have the least reason to behave in a civil and reciprocal
manner when dealing with their colleagues. There may be little hope for changing the
electoral structure that leads to safe districts. However, it may be possible through
careful recruitment practices to mitigate these effects, leading to a more civil, and
hopefully productive, Congress.
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APPENDIX A: ACTS OF INCIVILITY BY INDIVIDUAL
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Name

Details

Date

Abouezk,
Jim
Abzug,
Bella
Adams,
Brock
Allott,
Gordon
Arends,
Leslie C.
Armey,
Richard
Armey,
Richard
Armey,
Richard
Armey,
Richard
Armey,
Richard
Armey,
Richard
Aspin, Les

Broke Senate traditions by
refusing to run for reelection
Abandoned Congressional
norms as freshman
Reference to longstanding
uncivil rivalry vs. colleague
Rebuked opposition party

9 October, 1977, Washington Post, 3

15 August, 1955, New York Times, 8

Rebuked other chamber

24 October, 1971, New York Times, 56

Accused opposition of
doctoring statistics
Slurred colleague's sexual
orientation
Slurred colleague's sexual
orientation
Challenged colleague

26 May, 1991, New York Times, E2

16 March, 1997, New York Times, E2

Rebuked first lady

28 August, 2002, New York Times, A1

Rebuked colleague

13 July, 2001, Washington Post, A7

Sent out gloating press
release
Rebuked colleague

5 August, 1988, New York Times, A16

Bailey,
Josiah
William
Bailey,
Josiah
William
Barkley,
Alben
William
Barry,
David S.
Bayh, Birch
Bellenson,
Anthony
Bennett,
Wallace F.
Benton,
William
Biden,
Joseph R.
Bilbo,
Theodore
Gilmore
Bilbo,
Theodore
Gilmore

8 March, 1972, Washington Post, A20
11 May, 1992, Washington Post, C13

28 January, 1995, New York Times, 1
29 January, 1995, New York Times, E14

6 Aug, 1938, New York Times, 1

Lamented "group of socialists"
in own (dem) party, party
division
Extended uncivil exchange
with colleague

13 January, 1938, Washington Post, X2

Rebuked multiple colleagues

8 February, 1933, Washingtom Post, 1

Prolonged attack on fitness of
presidential nominee
Decried lack of civility in
Congress
Rebuked colleague

14 May, 1967, Washington Post, C7

19 June, 1954, New York Times, 7

Disparaged Colleague

2 February, 1951, Washington Post, 2

Rebuked colleague

22 October, 1987, New York Times, A1

Threatened campaign against
colleague @ reelection

26 January, 1936, New York Times, 6

Campaigned against
colleague @ reelection

25 January, 1936, New York Times, 6

18 April, 1944, New York Times, 13

23 January, 1996, New York Times, B6
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Black, Hugo
Lafayette
Blanton,
Tom
Bond,
Christopher
S
Bono,
Sonny
Boxer,
Barbara
Bradley,
Michael
Joseph
Bridges,
Styles
Bridges,
Styles
Brooke,
Edward
Brooks,
Jack
Brooks,
Jack
Burke,
Edward
Raymond
Burke,
Edward
Raymond
Burke,
Edward
Raymond
Burke,
Edward
Raymond
Burke,
Edward
Raymond
Burton,
Daniel
Bush,
George
H.W.
Byrd, Harry
Flood
Byrd, Harry
Flood
Byrd, Harry
Flood
Byrd, Harry
Flood
Byrd,

Rebuked multiple colleagues

4 June, 1936, New York Times, 1

Introduced resolution
supporting MOC parking
violators
Heated exchange vs.
colleague

23 February, 1936, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged colleague

25 September, 1996 Washington Post, B1

Held nominee "hostage"

25 October, 1999, Washington Post, A27

Rebuked speaker

4 June, 1943, New York Times, 11

Rebuked opposition party

15 August, 1955, New York Times, 8

Disparaged Colleague,
Opposition Party
Rebuked colleague

10 March, 1938, Washington Post, 1

18 March, 1992, Washington Post, A19

27 September, 1975, New York Times, 10

Disparaged current state of
Congress re: civility
Refused information to
colleague
Engaged in heated, nearly
violent debate

1 June, 1989, New York Times, A1

Rebuked colleague

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 34

Rebuked colleague

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

Heated exchange vs.
colleague

17 August, 1937, Washington Post, 1

Accused colleague of breach
of rules

6 August, 1939, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged President

13 May, 1998, Washington Post, A4

Called Senator "wimp" in note
passed during session.

28 September, 1987, New York Times, B6

Rebuked colleague

12 July, 1953, New York Times, E3

Rebuked colleague

12 June, 1934, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged Bureaucrats

2 May, 1942, Washington Post, 6

Demanded colleague's
resignation from partisan
position
Initiated roll call votes to

16 December, 1943, Washington Post, 15

28 November, 1994, Washington Post, C1
17 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

30 May, 1987, New York Times, 8
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Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrd,
Robert C.
Byrns,
Joseph
Wellington
Byrns,
Joseph
Wellington
Cain, Harry
P.
Cannon,
Clarence
Cannon,
Clarence
Cannon,
Clarence
Cannon,
Clarence
Cannon,
Howard W.
Capehart,
Homer E.
Capehart,
Homer E.
Case,
Clifford
Philip
Case,
Clifford
Philip
Celler,
Emanuel
Celler,
Emanuel
Chavez,

highlight absenteeism on a
Fri.
rebuked other chamber

19 January, 1995, New York Times, A1

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Heated exchange vs. Vice
President
Rebuked opposition party

11 August, 1986, Washington Post, A1

14 May, 1987, Washington Post, A10

Rebuked opposition party

20 May, 1987, Washington Post, A19

Used roll call votes to ensure
attendance on Fridays
Rebuked opposition party

30 May, 1987, Washington Post, A8

6 February, 1987, Washington Post, A6

16 September, 1987, Washington Post, A4

Threatened treaty failure due
to Congressional inefficiency
Rebuked multiple colleagues

27 May, 1988, Washington Post, A1
21 December, 1995, Washington Post, A15

Disparaged colleague

5 June, 1936, New York Times, 3

Rebuked colleague

18 January, 1933, Washington Post, 1

Belittled Senate proceedings

11 August, 1951, New York Times, 1

Manipulated rules to protest
cmte denying desired debate
Held budget hostage in
intrachamber dispute re:
norms
Held budget hostage in
intrachamber dispute re:
norms
Refused to adhere to
conference cmte norms
Rebuked lobbyists

17 July, 1955, New York Times, E6

Disparages colleague

29 May, 1957, New York Times, 15

Rebuked colleague

14 July, 1955, Washington Post, 56

Verbally battled colleague

15 May, 1964, New York Times 1

Rebuked colleague

9 October, 1977, New York Times, E4

Rebuffed governors before
hearing re: state officials
Rebuked multiple colleagues

2 July, 1960, New York Times, 37
11 January, 1967, Washington Post, A1

Introduced bill after agreement

27 January, 1946, New York Times, E10

17 June, 1962, New York Times, 35

25 June, 1962, New York Times, 17

15 July, 1962, New York Times, 108
13 June, 1959, Washington Post, A2
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Dennis
Chelf, Frank
Leslie
Cheney,
Dick
Cheney,
Dick
Clark, Joel
Bennett
Clark, Joel
Bennett
Clark, Joel
Bennett
Clark, Joel
Bennett
Cochrah,
Thad
Coehello,
Tony
Coelho,
Tony
Conable,
Barber B.
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Connally,
Thomas
Terry
Conyers,
John Jr.
Conyers,
John Jr.
Cooksey,
John
Copeland,
Royal S.
Couzens,
James
Cox,
Eugene E
Crane,
Daniel B.

to await State of Union
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
used profanity while rebuking
majority party for tactics
Rebuked Speaker

11 June, 1945, Washington Post, 1
19 November, 1983, New York Times, 12
16 March, 1988, New York Times, A22

Withdrew uncivil comments
about colleague
Rebuked colleague

7 April, 1934, New York Times, 4
6 June, 1940, New York Times, 14

Rebuked Colleague

28 October, 1939, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

2 April, 1942, Washington Post, 1

Questioned fitness of
committee leadership
Resigned rather than face
financial investigation
Sent out questionable press
release re:opponents' junkets
Rebuked other chamber

30 June, 1993, New Yokr Times, A13

6 November, 1971, New York Times, 18

Disparages Colleague

4 April, 1934, New York Times, 4

Rebuked colleague

29 October, 1939, New York Times, E1

Silenced opponent's questions
on Senate floor

10 May, 1949, New York Times, 3

Disputed colleague on floor

14 January, 1951, New York Times, E3

Various Tongue in Cheek
comments

21 Nobemver, 1937, Washington Post, B7

Rebuked Colleague

28 October, 1939, Washington Post, 1

Sent letter challenging
colleague's actions
Rebuked appointed special
prosecutor (Ken Starr)
Rebuked President

18 September, 1998, New York Times, A1

Disparaged Court nominee for
KKK ties
Resisted recess to press
favored policy
Physically battled colleague
on floor
Sexual affair with underaged
page

17 August, 1937, Washington Post, 1

28 May, 1989, New York Times, E1
6 September, 1981, Washington Post, A2

20 November, 1998, New York Times, A25
17 December, 1998, Washington Post, A37

4 June, 1936, New York Times, 1
26 June, 1949, New York Times, E1
21 July, 1983, New York Times, A1
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Culver,
John C
Cunningha
m, Randy
Curtis, Carl
T.
D'Amato,
Alfonse M.
D'Amato,
Alfonse M.
D'Amato,
Alfonse M.
D'Amato,
Alfonse M.
Danforth,
John C.
Daschle,
Tom
Daschle,
Tom
Daschle,
Tom
De Priest,
Oscar
Stanton
DeConcini,
Dennis
DeFazio,
Peter A
Delay, Tom
Delay, Tom
Delay, Tom
Delay, Tom
Dicks, Norm
Dies, Martin
Jr.
Dieterich,
William
Henry
Dietrich,
William H.
Dirksen,
Everett
McKinley
Dirksen,
Everett
McKinley
Dirksen,
Everett
McKinley
Dirksen,
Everett
McKinley

Rebuked multiple colleagues

18 July, 1979, Washington Post, A17

Rebuked colleague

12 June, 2000, Washington Post, A19

Left committee meeting room
in anger
Disparaged colleague

24 March, 1964, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked colleague

28 January, 1988, New York Times, B3

Disparaged Judge Lance Ito

23 October, 1995, New York Times, A12

Rebuked colleague

22 October, 1998, New York Times, B1

Rebuked multiple colleagues

12 July, 1991, New York Times, A1

Rebuked opposition

6 March, 1997, New York Times, B12

Threatened to keep Senate in
session through recess
Disparaged colleague

20 June, 2001, Washington Post, A4

Threatened Colleague
Physically

24 January, 1934, New York Times, 26

Rebuked multiple colleagues

20 May, 1982, New York Times, B16

Rebuked colleague

12 June, 2000, Washington Post, A19

Rebuked opposition
Physically assaulted colleague
Rebuked state court
Rebuked colleague
Interrupted colleague's
interview to assert himself
Disparaged government
bureaucrats
Engaged in heated, nearly
violent debate

27 January, 1997, New York Times, A15
18 April, 1997, Washington Post, A14
9 December, 2000, Washington Post, A16
18 January, 2004, Washington Post, A1
13 May, 1990, New York Times, SM34

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked colleague

17 August, 1937, Washington Post, 1

12 March, 1984, New York Times, B28

27 July, 2001, Washington Post, A1

2 February, 1943, New York Times, 40
17 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

24 May, 1960, New York Times, 1

Expressed contempt for
proposed rule change.

8 January, 1965, New York Times, 30

Rebuked Vice President

24 May, 1960, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked President

2 August, 1969, Washington Post, A1
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Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Dole,
Robert
Domenici,
Pete V.
Dornan,
Robert
Dornan,
Robert
Dornan,
Robert
Dornan,
Robert
Dornan,
Robert
Dornan,
Robert
Douglas,
Paul H.
Downey,
Thomas
Durenberge
r, David F.
Eastland,
James O.
Ellender,
Allen
Joseph
Fazio, Vic

Challenged Vice President

5 February, 1988, New York Times, A1

Rebuked colleague

24 November, 1993, New York Times, A21

Rebuked colleague

24 November, 1993, New York Times, A1

Gloated over political victory
over partisan rival
Locked presidential primary
rival out of meaningful
positions
Rebuked colleagues

25 June, 1995, New York Times, 16

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked opposition party

9 October, 1995, New York Times, A11

24 July, 1985, Washington Post, A5
11 August, 1986, Washington Post, A1
14 May, 1987, Washington Post, A10

Heated exchange vs. Vice
President
Rebuked opposition party

5 February, 1988, Washington Post, A1
18 July, 1990, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked opposition party

22 July, 1990, Washington Post, A16

Rebuked opposition VP
nominee
Rebuked opposition party

5 October, 1992, Washington Post, A4

Rebuked opposition

6 March, 1997, New York Times, B12

Physically assaulted colleague

5 March, 1985, New York Times, B2

Rebuked President,
discpilined
Disparaged President

26 January, 1995, New York Times, A18
27 June, 1995, New York Times, A14

Rebuked President

23 October, 1995, New York Times, A12

Disparaged President

16 March, 1997, New York Times, E2

Accused President of treason

6 March, 1997, Washington Post, B1

Rebuked own party

19 August, 1962, New York Times, 142

Challenged colleague

16 March, 1997, New York Times, E2

Questioned motives of
presidential administration &
CIA
Disparaged Supreme Court
decision
Exploited unanimous consent
to hold issue hostage

19 May, 1986, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked colleague

8 September, 1989, Washington Post, A6

7 June, 1995, Washington Post, A5

12 March, 1960, Washington Post, A1
20 June, 1948, New York Times, 1
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Filner, Bob
Flanders,
Ralph E
Flanders,
Ralph E
Flanders,
Ralph E
Flanders,
Ralph E
Flanders,
Ralph E
Foley,
Thomas S.
Ford,
Wendell
Frank,
Barney
Frank,
Barney
Frank,
Barney
Frank,
Barney
Frank,
Barney
Frist, Bill
Frist, Bill
Frist, Bill
Fulbright,
William
Fulbright,
William
Fulbright,
William
Fulbright,
William
Fulbright,
William
Fullbright,
William
Gandy,
Fred
Garn, Jake
George,
Walter
Franklin
Gephardt,
Richard A.
Gephardt,
Richard A.
Gephardt,
Richard A.

Disparaged opposition party
Moves to strip colleague's
powers
Called for dismissal of
colleague
Interrupted Colleague on floor

18 April, 1998, New York Times, A8
12 June, 1954, New York Times, 1

Called for Censure of
Colleague
Called for Censure of
Colleague
Called for return to Comity

28 July, 1954, Washington Post, 10

12 June, 1954, Washington Post, 1
12 June, 1954, Washington Post, 1

31 July, 1954, Washington Post, 1
2 June, 1989, New York Times, A1

Cited Puerto Rico's cultural
differences
Lamented "meanness and
intolerance" since Republican
takeover
Implied bigotry of opposition
party
Disparaged Speaker

22 February, 1991, New York Times, A28

18 April, 1998, New York Times, A8

Rebuked Opposition party

18 September, 1998, New York Times, A1

Challenged appointed special
prosecutor (Ken Starr)
Rebuked opposition
Campaigned against
colleague @ reelection
Rebuked opposition party
Challenged colleague

20 November, 1998, New York Times, A25

27 May, 2005, New York Times, A8
2 August, 1969, New York Times, 24

Rebuked colleague

2 October, 1971, New York Times, 11

rebuked colleague

15 August, 1972, New York Times, 6

Called attention to pork,
rebuked colleague
Rebuked colleague

4 October, 1972, New York Times, 97
15 July, 1966, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked opposition party

2 July, 1960, New York Times, 1

Decried lack of comity in
Senate
Rebuked colleague
Rebuked President,
disparaged party

1 October, 1994, New York Times, 1

29 January, 1995, New York Times, E2

2 February, 1995, New York Times, A23

8 November, 2003, New York Times, A12
20 November, 2004, New York Times, A1

20 May, 1982, New York Times, B16
27 January, 1946, New York Times, E10

Rebuked opposition

6 March, 1997, New York Times, B12

Disparaged own party

17 January, 1998, New York Times, A9

Profanity during address

13 July, 2001, Washington Post, A7

64

Gibbons,
Sam
Gibbons,
Sam
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Gingrich,
Newt
Glass,
Carter
Glass,
Carter
Glass,
Carter
Glenn, John
Gore, Albert
Sr.
Gorton,
Slade
Gorton,
Slade
Gramm,
Phil
Gramm,
Phil
Grassley,
Charles E
Grassley,
Charles E
Grassley,
Charles E
Gravel,
Mike
Gray,
Kenneth J.
Green,
Edith
Green,
Theodore F.

Physically assaulted colleague

25 September, 1996 Washington Post, B1

Physically assaulted colleague

6 March, 1997, Washington Post, B1

Rebuked multiple colleagues

19 May, 1984, New York Times, 7

Initiated investigation of
colleague's royalties from
book
Referred to passed bills as
"trash" humorously
Disparaged President

27 May, 1988, New York Times, A13

Implied opposition might
destroy documents
Rebuked colleague
Disparaged opposition party
without warning
Assorted assaults on
Congressional comity
Unspecified House ethics
violations
Rebuked Colleague

7 October, 1992, New York Times, D19
14 November, 1994, New York Times,A17
14 November, 1994, New York Times,A17
27 January, 1997, New York Times, A15
20 May, 1984, Washington Post, A2
3 January, 1985, Washington Post, B1
11 January, 1997, Washington Post, A1
22 February, 1935, Washington Post, 1.

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Disparaged government
bureaucrats
Rebuked colleague
Rebuked own party

28 January, 1937, Washington Post, 1

20 November, 1983, New York Times, E4
12 January, 1960, Washington Post, A1

rebuked other chamber

18 July, 1985, Washington Post, A3

Reference to longstanding
uncivil rivalry vs. colleague
Threatened party change after
cmte reassignment
Resigned in protest, reelected
as member of other party
Questioned fitness of
committee leadership
Verbally accosted colleague in
office
Repuked opposition party

11 May, 1992, Washington Post, C13

Disparaged colleague

8 October, 1976, Washington Post, A3

Decried lack of comity
between chambers on floor
Questioned strength of
passed bill.
Formally rebuked colleague

28 September, 1968, New York Times, 20

26 February, 1938, Washington Post, X1

4 January, 1983, New York Times, A14
11 Februqary, 1999, New York Times, A30
30 June, 1993, New Yokr Times, A13
15 June, 1981, Washington Post, D13
28 January, 1988, Washington Post, A14

11 June, 1972, New York Times, E1
23 July, 1950, New York Times, E2
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Guffey,
Joseph F
Guffey,
Joseph F
Hancock,
Clarence
Eugene
Harkin, Tom
Harkin, Tom
Harrison,
Byron
Patton
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hatch, Orrin
G.
Hayden,
Carl
Hayden,
Carl
Hays,
Wayne
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,

Disparaged colleagues

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

Rebuked bipartisan alliance

16 December, 1943, Washington Post, 15

Accused unnamed colleague
of caring judges/policemen

25 April, 1936, New York Times, 3

Demanded vote be voided
Rebuked colleague
Refused ceremonial courtesy
of colleague

12 May, 1981, New York Times, D22
2 August, 1983, New York Times, A16
27 December, 1936, New York Times, E9

Loudly protested perceived
violation of rule of debate
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked colleague

22 October, 1987, New York Times, A1

5 May, 2003, New York Times, A22

Rebuked colleague

28 October, 2003, New York Times, A19

Repeated arguments to take
floor from colleagues
Rebuked Colleague

22 October, 1987, Washington Post, A14

Referred to colleague's drunk
driving in rebuke
Mild rebuke of colleague
Held budget hostage in
intrachamber dispute re:
norms
Held budget hostage in
intrachamber dispute re:
norms
Personal grudge with
colleague of other house
Reneged on intricate Senate
deal
Rebuked multiple colleagues
Threatened to hold military
policies hostage
Held nominations hostage
Attempted to take over
committee position from
colleague
Questioned fitness of
committee leadership
Rebuked colleague
Sexually and racially harassed
colleague
Filibustered nominee to

15 July, 1994, New York Times, A14

25 February, 1988, Washington Post, A1
17 October, 1991, Washington Post, A2
1 May, 2003, Washington Post, C3
17 June, 1962, New York Times, 35

25 June, 1962, New York Times, 17

4 December, 1973, Washington Post, A8
21 September, 1981, Washington Post, A2
21 September, 1982, Washington Post, A2
2 December, 1982, Washington Post, A2
31 October, 1985, New York Times, A26
3 December, 1986, New York Times, B14

30 June, 1993, New Yokr Times, A13
23 July, 1993, New York Times, B6
12 August, 1993, New York Times, A24
11 October, 1993, New York Times, A16
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Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Helms,
Jesse
Hoffman,
Clare
Eugene
Holifield,
Chester
Earl
Hollings,
Ernest F.
Hollings,
Ernest F.
Hollings,
Ernest F.
Holt, Rush
Dew
Holt, Rush
Dew
Holt, Rush
Dew
Holt, Rush
Dew
Hopkins,
Larry J.
Hosmer,
Craig
Howell,
Robert B.
Humphrey,
Hubert
Horatio
Hyde,
Henry
Inhofe,
James M
Inouye,
Daniel
Jackson,
Henry M.
Jackson,
Henry M.
Jackson,
Henry M.
Javits,
Jacob K.
Javits,
Jacob K.
Jeffords,
James

prevent vote
Threatened well-being of
president
Rebuked multiple colleagues

23 October, 1995, New York Times, A12
13 September, 1997, New York Times, 23

Held up nomination of former
rival
Heated argument with labor
leader

5 November, 1999, New York Times, A28

Rebuked multiple colleagues

5 May, 1950, Washington Post, 20

Blocked consideration of
treaty
Racially offensive remark

1 October, 1994, New York Times, 1

31 August, 1948, Washington Post, 10

1 March, 1994, Washington Post, A17

Various quips mentioned in
retrospective of career
Rebuked colleague

14 October, 2004, Washington Post, C1
22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 34

Rebuked colleague

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

Disparaged Colleague

8 August, 1940, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged Colleague

11 August, 1940, Washington Post, 21

Rebuked colleague

16 July, 1987, Washington Post, A19

Scheduled floor time to air
grievances vs. president
Rebukes Colleague

10 April, 1962, New York Times, 26
10 February, 1933 New York Times, 2

Challenged speaker

2 October, 1971, New York Times, 11

Sexual indiscretion

21 December, 1998, New York Times, A28

Rebuked colleague

2 October, 2003, Washingotn Post, A6

Rebuked multiple colleagues

7 January, 1973, Washington Post, B7

urged supporters to leave,
usurping leadership duties
Rebuked colleague

12 August, 1972, New York Times, 1
15 August, 1972, New York Times, 6

Rebuked Colleague

8 October, 1976, Washington Post, A3

Threatened Filibuster

2 May, 1964, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

6 November, 1971, New York Times, 18

Boycotted committee meeting
to block presidential nominee

2 October, 2003, Washingotn Post, A6
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Jepsen,
Roger W.
Jepsen,
Roger W.
Johnson,
Hiram W.
Johnson,
Lyndon B.
Johnson,
Lyndon B.
Johnston,
Olin D.
Keating,
Kenneth B.
Keating,
Kenneth B.
Kem,
James
Preston
Kennedy,
Edward M.
Kennedy,
Edward M.
Kennedy,
Edward M.
Kennedy,
Edward M.
Kennedy,
Edward M.
Kingston,
Jack
Knowland,
William F.
Koch,
Edward I.
Kyl, John
LaHood,
Ray
Langer,
William
Lautenberg,
Frank R.
Leahy,
Patrick J.
Leahy,
Patrick J.
Leahy,
Patrick J.
Leahy,
Patrick J.
Leahy,
Patrick J.
Leland,
Mickey

Rebuked colleague

2 August, 1983, New York Times, A16

Verbally accosted colleague in
office
Snubbed Colleague at
swearing-in
Rebuked opposition party

15 June, 1981, Washington Post, D13
4 January, 1941, Washington Post, 19
15 August, 1955, New York Times, 8

Reacted personally to
disparaging comments
Rebuked colleague

29 July, 1954, Washington Post, 55
13 May, 1958, Washington Post, A2

Rebuked colleague

2 July, 1960, New York Times, 37

Rebuked colleague

28 February, 1964, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked colleague

10 May, 1950, New York Times, 27

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked colleague

15 July, 1994, New York Times, A14
16 October, 1991, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked colleague

17 October, 1991, Washington Post, A2

Rebuked President

24 September, 2003, Washington Post, A25

Rebuked President

18 January, 2004, Washington Post, A1

Disparaged multiple
colleagues
Rebuked opposition party

19 October, 2001, Washington Post, A16
15 August, 1955, New York Times, 8

Eulogized enemy leader,
interrupted colleague
Rebuked colleague
Rebuked own party

7 September, 1969, New York Times, 51
28 October, 2003, New York Times, A19
19 July, 2003, Washington Post, A1

Held up judicial nomination

2 March, 1954, New York Times, 24

Rebuked colleague

20 November, 2004, New York Times, A1

Rebuked rivals

23 November, 2000, New York Times, A33

Rebuked colleague

28 October, 2003, New York Times, A19

Rebuked opposition party

5 October, 1998, Washington Post, A4

rebuked other chamber

24 January, 1999, Washington Post, A17

Rebuked Vice President

26 June, 2004, Washington Post, A4

Disparaged colleague

7 September, 1986, Washington Post, SM59
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Levin,
Sander, M.
Lewis, John
Lewis, John
Logan,
Marvel Mills
Logan,
Marvel Mills
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long, Huey
Long,
Russell B.
Long,
Russell B.
Long,
Russell B.
Long,
Russell B.
Lott, Trent
Lott, Trent
Lott, Trent
Lott, Trent
Lott, Trent
Lowey, Nita
Lucas,
Scott W.
Lucas,
Scott W.
Lucas,
Scott W.
Lucas,
Scott W.
Lugar,
Richard
Lungren,
Daniel E
Mack,
Connie

Rebuked colleague

13 May, 2005, New York Times, A20

Rebuked Speaker
Prolonged attack on speaker
Rebuked multiple colleagues

24 January, 1995, New York Times, A1
16 February, 1995, Washington Post, A25
7 July, 1937, New York Times, 1

Rebuked counsellor

15 November, 1933, Washington Post, 1

Rebukes Atty General
Obstructed Nominations
Threatened Political action vs.
colleague
Withdrew uncivil comments
about colleague
Disparages President
Filibuster
Constant threats of Filibuster
Failed filibuster
Disruptive on Congress Floor
Rebuked colleague
Rebuked colleague
Filibuster
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked Vice President

22 February, 1933, New York Times, 2
27 March, 1934, New York Times, 20
6 April, 1934, New York Times, 22

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Heated conflict with partisan

7 April, 1934, New York Times, 4
28 April, 1935, New York Times, E7
14 June, 1935, New York Times, 2
16 June, 1935, New York Times, E3
16 June, 1935, New York Times, E1
21 January, 1933, Washington Post, 2
31 January, 1933, Washington Post, 3
6 March, 1935, Washington Post, 1
22 May, 1935, Washington Post, 1
25 February, 1965, New York Times, 7
27 February, 1975, New York Times, 73
20 June, 1964, Washington Post, A1
19 January, 1966, Washington Post, A21

Rebuked President
Rebuked multiple colleagues
attempted to eliminate
opposition from proceedings
Avenged defeat with
disruptive votes
Rebuked opposition party
Rebuked opposition party
Rebuked colleague

11 Novemer, 1996, New York Times, A1
2 November, 1997, New York Times, WK6
8 January, 1999, New York Times, A15

8 February, 1997, Washington Post, A4
8 August, 1996, New York Times, B9
10 May, 1950, New York Times, 27

Rebuked Colleague

16 December, 1943, Washington Post, 15

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked Colleague

31 July, 1949, Washington Post, B5
30 August, 1949, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

9 August, 1997, Washington Post, A1

Called colleague on violation
of rules on floor
Rebuked president

30 September, 1988, Washington Post, A25

16 March, 2002, New York Times, A11

21 December, 1995, Washington Post, A15
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Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Mansfield,
Michael
Joseph
Marcantoni
o, Vito
Anthony
Markey,
Edward J
Martin,
Joseph W.
McCain,
John
McCarran,
Pat
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,

Rebuked opposition party

2 July, 1960, New York Times, 1

Rebuked Senate inefficiency

21 February, 1963, New York Times, 1

Verbally battled colleague

15 May, 1964, New York Times 1

Stormed out of chamber after
moving to adjour (no vote)

23 January, 1967, New York Times, 1

Called amendment to avenge
usurping of leadership power

12 August, 1972, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

28 February, 1964, Washington Post, A1

Heated conflict with partisan

19 January, 1966, Washington Post, A21

Heated exchange vs.
colleague

11 June, 1945, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged opposition Party

17 December, 1998, Washington Post, A37

Disparaged colleague

13 August, 1957, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked own party

23 May, 2004, Washington Post, D1

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked colleague

31 July, 1949, Washington Post, B5
22 July, 1953, New York Times, 6

Vulgar statements on record

4 March, 1954, New York Times, 24

Rebuked presidential
administration
Rebuked Colleague

7 March, 1954, New York Times, E1
12 June, 1954, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

9 November, 1954, New York Times, 1

Refuses to apologize for
uncivil acts
Disparaged Colleague

12 November, 1954, New York Times, 1

Accused communist sympathy

30 March, 1950, Washington Post, 1

Accused communist sympathy

2 February, 1951, Washington Post, 2

Sarcastic remarks aimed at
witness
Gross violation of
Congressional Ethics
Rebuked colleague

23 April, 1954 Washington Post, 30

14 November, 1954, New York Times, 44

11 August, 1954, Washington Post, 1
2 September, 1954, Washington Post, 8
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Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McCarthy,
Joseph R.
McClellan,
John L.
McClellan,
John L.
McClellan,
John L.
McCormick,
John W.
McCrery,
Jim
McDermott,
Jim
McDermott,
Jim
McGee,
Gale
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McKellar,
Kenneth
Douglas
McMahon,
Brien
Meany,
George
Meehan,
Martin T.
Metzenbau
m, Howard
M.

Spoke accepting censure,
rebuked communists
Repeatedly Disparaged
colleagues
Various improprieties (litany of
charges)
Attempted to block vote on
own censure
Challenged colleague

11 November, 1954, Washington Post, 33

7 March, 1958, New York Times, 1

Outburst on Floor

7 April, 1962, New York Times, 9

Rebuked colleague

18 June, 1955, Washington Post, 39

Rebuked colleague

9 November, 1954, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

13 May, 2005, New York Times, A20

Rebuked speaker

17 January, 1997, New York Times, A22

Released intercepted cell
phone calls of rivals
Personal grudge with
colleague of other house
Filibuster in cmte w/o being a
member of same

14 November, 1999, Washington Post, Bq

Prolonged attack on fitness of
presidential nominee

2 November, 1947, New York Times, E10

Disparaged Colleague

28 March, 1935, Washington Post, 2

Rebuked Colleague

10 March, 1938, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged Bureaucrats

2 May, 1942, Washington Post, 6

Disparaged Bureaucrats

24 May, 1944, Washington Post, 8

Assaulted Colleague with
weapon (gavel)

27 August, 1950, Washington Post, B5

Formally rebuked colleague

23 July, 1950, New York Times, E2

Challenged colleague

2 August, 1969, New York Times, 24

Rebuked appointed special
prosecutor (Ken Starr)
Placed holds on bills with
excessive riders.

20 November, 1998, New York Times, A25

17 November, 1954, Washington Post, 14
19 November, 1954, Washington Post, 61
30 November, 1954, Washington Post, 14

4 December, 1973, Washington Post, A8
4 March, 1947, New York Times, C24

1 October, 1982, New York Times, A20
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Metzenbau
m, Howard
M.
Mica, John
Mica, John
Michel,
Robert H.
Michel,
Robert H.
Michel,
Robert H.
Michel,
Robert H.
Miller,
George
Mills, Wilbur

Minton,
Sherman
Minton,
Sherman
Minton,
Sherman
Minton,
Sherman
Minton,
Sherman
Monaghan,
Joseph
Patrick
Mondale,
Walter F.
Monroney,
Almer
Stillwell
Mike
Moran, Jim
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morse,
Wayne
Morton,
Thurston

Heated exchange vs.
colleague

15 July, 1994, New York Times, A14

Disparaged President
Disparaged President
Rebuked opposition
leadership
Rebuked Opposition

25 September, 1996 Washington Post, B1
6 March, 1997, Washington Post, B1
8 March, 1985, New York Times, A22

Disparaged colleague

7 September, 1986, Washington Post, SM59

Rebuked colleague

16 July, 1987, Washington Post, A19

Rebuked Speaker

11 January, 1997, Washington Post, A1

Refused to pass
administration bill til demands
met
Rebuked multiple colleagues

4 August, 1968, New York Times, E14

7 July, 1937, New York Times, 1

Rebuked Journalist

5 April, 1936, Washington Post, B4

Disparaged Colleague

4 May, 1938, Washington Post, X8

Disparaged Colleague

8 August, 1940, Washington Post,

Disparaged Colleague

11 August, 1940, Washington Post, 21

Challenged speaker

5 June, 1936, New York Times, 3

Supported change in filibuster
rules
Rebuked colleague

27 February, 1975, New York Times, 73
22 July, 1953, New York Times, 6

Physically assaulted colleague
Disparages Colleague

6 March, 1997, Washington Post, B1
29 May, 1957, New York Times, 15

Moved to stem opposition's
filibuster efforts
Verbally battled colleague

6 March, 1960, New York Times, E1
16 August, 1962, New York Times, 14

Rebuked own party

19 August, 1962, New York Times, 142

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked Colleague

25 February, 1965, New York Times, 7

Ongoing personal feud vs
colleague
Ripped up colleague's motion
on floor

16 March, 1988, New York Times, A22

25 July, 1946, Washington Post, 6
27 August, 1950, Washington Post, B5
6 March, 1960, New York Times, E1
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Moseley
Braun,
Carol
Moynihan,
Patrick
Moynihan,
Patrick
Moynihan,
Patrick
Mundt, Karl
E.
Mundt, Karl
E.
Murphy,
Austin J.
Muskie,
Edmund
Sixtus
Neely,
Matthew
Mansfield
Neely,
Matthew
Mansfield
Nunn, Sam
Nunn, Sam
Obey,
David R.
Obey,
David R.
O'Connor,
John J.
O'Connor,
John J.
O'Daniel,
W. Lee
Oepel, John
Henry
O'Mahoney,
Joseph
Christopher
O'Mahoney,
Joseph
Christopher
O'Neill,
Thomas P.
Jr.
O'Neill,
Thomas P.
Jr.
O'Neill,
Thomas P.
Jr.

Accused Senate of racism for
defending confederate flag

23 July, 1993, New York Times, B6

Rebuked colleague

20 January, 1986, Washington Post, A5

Without proper warning,
rebuked absent colleague on
floor
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Shouting match with union
lawyer during hearing
Rebuked Pentagon

22 January, 1986, Washington Post, A12

Allowed someone else to cast
his vote, reprimanded
Challenged colleague

18 March, 1992, Washington Post, A19
7 March, 1958, New York Times, 1
12 December, 1954, Washington Post, 1
19 December, 1987, New York Times, 10
17 May, 1973, New York Times, 35

Refused ceremonial courtesy
of colleague

27 December, 1936, New York Times, E9

Left committee meeting room
in anger

17 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

Rebuked President
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Rebuked multiple colleagues

5 August, 1988, New York Times, A16
16 September, 1987, Washington Post, A4
18 April, 1998, New York Times, A8

Rebuked colleague

12 June, 2000, Washington Post, A19

Refused to release witness to
Senate
Rebuked colleague

15 August, 1935, Washington Post, 1
16 April, 1936, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged Judicial nominee

3 March, 1943, Washington Post, 11

Disparages Colleague

30 January, 1935, New York Times, 5

Rebuked colleague

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 34

Rebuked colleague

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1

Rebuked president

16 November, 1973, New York Times, 85

Rebuked colleague

19 May, 1984, New York Times, 7

Rebuked opposition
leadership

8 March, 1985, New York Times, A22
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Overton,
John
Holmes
Packwood,
Robert
Packwood,
Robert
Packwood,
Robert
Packwood,
Robert
Pastore,
John O.
Pastore,
John O.
Pastore,
John O.
Pearson,
James B.
Pelosi,
Nancy
Pelosi,
Nancy
Pepper,
Claude
Denson
Pepper,
Claude
Denson
Percy,
Charles H.
Pittman,
Key
Pitts,
Joseph R.
Plumley,
Charles
Albert
Powell,
Adam
Clayton
Pressler,
Larry
Proxmire,
William
Rabaut,
Louis C.
Rangel,
Charles B
Rankin,
John Elliott
Rayburn,
Samuel
Taliaferro

Disparaged party

27 January, 1946, New York Times, E10

Disparaged President

19 April, 1982, Washington Post, A11

Rebuked Colleague

19 April, 1982, Washington Post, A11

Arrested, glib comments
re:arrest afterward
Inappropriate interactions with
female office employees
Verbally battled colleague

25 February, 1988, Washington Post, A1
6 December, 1992, Washington Post, C1
16 August, 1962, New York Times, 14

Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Fiery rhetoric at keynote
address of convention (type of
con unclear)
Supported change in filibuster
rules
Rebuked opposition party

20 June, 1964, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked colleague

19 July, 2003, New York Times, A1

Rebuked colleague

6 Aug, 1938, New York Times, 1

Rebuked multiple colleagues

6 August, 1939, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

5 May, 1981, New York Times, A2

Exploited rules to silence
colleagues
rebuked president

11 July, 1937, New York Times, 49
18 December, 1998, New York Times, A1

Rebuked Colleague

16 April, 1936, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked multiple colleagues

11 January, 1967, Washington Post, A1

Questioned fitness of
committee leadership
Embarassed colleague in
writing
Manipulated rules to protest
cmte denying desired debate
Rebuked opposition party

30 June, 1993, New Yokr Times, A13

19 July, 2003, Washington Post, A1

Rebuked Journalist

24 May, 1945, Washington Post, 6

Rebuked multiple colleagues

6 May, 1941, New York Times, 5

17 November, 1964, Washington Post, A17

27 February, 1975, New York Times, 73
18 December, 1998, New York Times, A1

14 February, 1972, Washington Post, D13
17 July, 1955, New York Times, E6
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Reece,
Brazilla
Carroll
Reed,
Daniel A.
Reid, Harry
Reid, Harry
Robinson,
Joseph
Taylor
Robinson,
Joseph
Taylor
Robinson,
Joseph
Taylor
Robinson,
Joseph
Taylor
Rockefeller,
John
Rockefeller,
John
Rohrabache
r, Dana
Rostenkows
ki, Daniel
Rothman,
Steven R.
Rudman,
Warren B.
Russel,
Richard B.
Russel,
Richard B.
Russel,
Richard B.
Russel,
Richard B.
Russell,
Richard
Brevard Jr.
Sabath,
Adolph J
Santorum,
Richard
Saxbe,
William B.
Schroeder,
Patricia
Schumer,
Charles E.
Schumer,
Charles E.

Rebuked colleague

16 July, 1957, Washington Post, A12

Refused cooperation with
presidential administration.
Rebuked colleague
Disparaged President
Disparages Colleague

5 July, 1953, New York Times, SM9
30 November, 2003, New York Times, WK10
15 May, 2005, New York Times, 1
22 January, 1933 New York Times, 20

Exploited rules to silence
colleagues

11 July, 1937, New York Times, 49

Rebuked Colleague

6 March, 1935, Washington Post, 1

Disparaged Colleague

22 May, 1935, Washington Post, 1

Ignored opposition cries to be
recognized on floor
Apologized for refusing to
recognize opposing speaker
Disparaged President

27 February, 1975, New York Times, 73
24 April, 1975, New York Times, 73
17 December, 1998, Washington Post, A37

Postured for prolonged battle
with partisan rival
Rebuked opposition party

19 January, 1989, New York Times, B9

Rebuked opposition

24 April, 1985, New York Times, A1

Interrupted colleague on floor

2 May, 1964, New York Times, 1

Decried lack of comity on floor

19 January, 1968, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

28 November, 1963, Washington Post, A6

Rebuked colleague

15 July, 1966, Washington Post, A1

Angrily refuted colleagues

15 August, 1959, New York Times, 1

Physically battled colleague
on floor
Rebuked president

26 June, 1949, New York Times, E1

Disparaged colleague

16 January, 1971, New York Times, 18

Disparaged Senate as an
institution
Rebuked colleague

14 July, 1993, Washington Post, A1
22 October, 1998, New York Times, B1

Rebuked opposition party

25 June, 2003, Washington Post, A21

17 January, 1999, New York Times, NJ2

21 December, 1995, Washington Post, A15
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Schwellenb
ach, Lewis
Scott, Hugh
Simpson,
Alan K.
Simpson,
Alan K.
Simpson,
Alan K.
Simpson,
Alan K.
Simpson,
Alan K.
Smathers,
George A.
Smathers,
George A.
Smith,
Robert C
Snell,
Bertrand
Hollis
Snyder,
Gene
Sparkman,
John J.
Specter,
Arlen
Stark, Pete
Steed, Tom
Stennis,
John C.
Stevens,
Ted
Stevens,
Ted
Stevenson,
Adlai E.
Studds,
Gerry E.
Sweeney,
Martin
Leonard
Taft, Robert
Alphonso
Thomas,
William
Thomas,
William
Thomas,
William

Rebuked Journalist

5 April, 1936, Washington Post, B4

Rebuked colleague
Rebuked colleague

24 March, 1964, Washington Post, A1
24 December, 1982, New York Times, A12

Rebuked multiple colleagues

12 July, 1991, New York Times, A1

Regularly defied norms of
freshman deferance to
superiors
Rebuked opposition party

22 January, 1980, Washington Post, A2

Rebuked opposition VP
nominee
Rebuked colleague
Heated exchange vs.
colleague
Accused bureaucrats of coverup conspiracy
Rebuked colleague

16 September, 1987, Washington Post, A4
5 October, 1992, Washington Post, A4
12 January, 1960, Washington Post, A1
20 June, 1964, Washington Post, A1
8 September, 1993, New York Times, A16
16 April, 1936, Washington Post, 1

Held rival's issues hostage as
revenge for vote
Disparaged Colleague

13 May, 1990, New York Times, SM34

Rebuked opposition party

1 October, 1994, New York Times, 1

Exchanged obscenities in
committee meeting
Threatened blackmail to
protect franking privilege
Denied request to delay vote,
manipulating turnout
Threatened to campaign
against colleague
Disparaged colleage

24 July, 2003, New York Times, A15

Advocated minority policy in
foreign press
Sexual affair with underaged
page
Rebuked colleague

24 May, 1960, New York Times, 1

8 March, 1935, Washington Post, 2

Disputed colleague on floor

14 January, 1951, New York Times, E3

Called police to break up
opposition meeting
Called police to break up
opposition meeting
Called police to break up
opposition meeting

19 July, 2003, New York Times, C1

29 July, 1954, Washington Post, 55

28 November, 1963, Washington Post, A6
2 October, 1971, New York Times, 11
1 October, 1982, New York Times, A20
2 December, 1982, Washington Post, C5

21 July, 1983, New York Times, A1

19 July, 2003, Washington Post, A1
24 July, 2003, Washington Post, A1
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Thompson,
Fred R
Thompson,
Fred R
Thurmond,
Strom
Thurmond,
Strom
Thurmond,
Strom
Tower,
John
Trible, Paul
S. Jr.
Tunnel,
James
Miller
Tunnel,
James
Miller
Tydings,
Millard E.
Utt, James
B.
Vandenberg
, Arthur
Hendrick
Walker,
Robert S
Walter,
Robert
Warner,
John
Waters,
Maxine
Watkins,
Arthur
Vivian
Watkins,
Arthur
Vivian
Watson,
Albert W.
Watt,
Melvin D.
Waxman,
Henry
Weber, Vin
Weicker,
Lowel
Wellstone,
Paul
Wheeler,
Burton

Rebuked colleague

25 June, 1997, Washington Post, A4

Rebuked President

8 October, 1997, Washington Post, A1

Challenged colleague

17 May, 1973, New York Times, 35

Manipulated rules to bar door
and seal records for floor
debate
Disparaged colleague

13 April, 1963, Washington Post, A2

13 September, 1980, Washington Post, A8

Wrote letter demanding cochairmanship of committee
Rebuked opposition

29 September, 1981, New York Times, A14
27 October, 1987, New York Times, A32

Rebuked multiple colleagues

21 November, 1945, New York Times, 3

Rebuked colleague

13 July, 1946, New York Times, 3

Formally rebuked colleague

23 July, 1950, New York Times, E2

Scheduled floor time to air
grievances vs. president
Rebuked colleague

10 April, 1962, New York Times, 26
4 March, 1947, New York Times, C24

Disparaged opposition party
without warning
Litany of disruptive/mildly
uncivil activities
Rebuked Secretary of State

20 May, 1984, Washington Post, A2

12 May, 2004, New York Times, 14

rebuked colleague

18 December, 1998, New York Times, A1

Challenged colleague

9 November, 1954, New York Times, 1

Demanded censure of
colleague

17 November, 1954, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

7 September, 1969, New York Times, 51

Disparaged independent
prosecutor's investigation
Rebuked opposition party

20 November, 1998, Washington Post, A31

Rebuked Speaker
Rebuked Colleague

16 March, 1988, New York Times, A22
26 June, 1979, Washington Post, A3

Demanded colleagues to take
positions immediately
Rebuked colleague

8 Janury, 1997, New York Times, B8

7 September, 1986, Washington Post, SM59

25 June, 1997, Washington Post, A4

22 Aug, 1937, New York Times, 1
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Kendall
Wheeler,
Burton
Kendall
Wheeler,
Burton
Kendall
Wherry,
Kenneth S.
Wherry,
Kenneth S.
Wherry,
Kenneth S.
Wiley,
Alexander
Wiley,
Alexander
Williams,
John J.
Williams,
Pat
Wirth,
Timothy
Wright, Jim
Wright, Jim
Wright, Jim
Zioncheck,
Marion
Anthony
Zorinsky,
Edward

Rebuked colleague

12 June, 1934, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

28 October, 1939, Washington Post, 1

Rebuked colleague

30 August, 1949, Washington Post, 1

Ongoing personal feud vs
colleague
Rebuked Colleague

27 August, 1950, Washington Post, B5
24 June, 1951, Washington Post, B3

Extended uncivil exchange
with colleague
Rebuked opposition party

18 April, 1944, New York Times, 13
2 July, 1960, New York Times, 1

Rebuked colleague

13 May, 1958, Washington Post, A2

Rebuked party vice
presidential nominee
Rebuked colleague

30 September, 1988, Washington Post, A25
28 January, 1988, New York Times, B3

Rebuked colleague
Postured for prolonged battle
with partisan rival
Disparaged colleague
physically battled police over
traffic ticket

27 May, 1988, New York Times, A13
19 January, 1989, New York Times, B9

Rebuked Secretary of State

8 March, 1984, New York Times, A11

7 September, 1986, Washington Post, SM59
24 April, 1936, New York Times, 23
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK
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Name – the name of either the implicated legislator or a control group member
Margin – The margin of victory for the individual in his/her most recent election,
computed as 100*(x-y)/(x+y), where x is the individual’s votes in previous election and y
are the votes of the number two vote-getter. Multiplication by 100 gives us a more
intuitive number, as this figure will be used in regression analysis and a predicted
probability. Put another way, this measures the percentage of the electorate that voted for
the delegate above and beyond the number that voted for his or her chief opponent. For
Steven Young (74th Congress, R-OH), difference between himself and third vote-getter
was used (at large, two appointments at stake). Members with no opponent listed will be
coded 100, as they are among the safest members of Congress. Those members whose
only opponent is “write-in”, “scatter,” or “scatter or blank” will be coded 100, as they are
essentially unopposed.
Carl Curtis (R-NE) uses his score for the 1954 election, though he appears as a control
for 1953, as he won his seat in the ’54 election and was appointed to the remainder of the
term of his predecessor. As he was never implicated in an act of incivility, before or after
that election, it is appropriate to use that score as a surrogate, as he was acting with
knowledge of the outcome of that election, and did not serve before that election took
place.
Paper – the paper in which the mention occurred. “1” = New York Times and “2” = the
Washington Post
Mentions – the variable equals the number of times someone was implicated in an article.
For control group members this will always equal “0”
Year – the year the article was published
Day – the day the article was published
Month – the month the article was published
Birth year – the year the legislator was born
Birth day – the day the legislator was born
Birth month – the month the legislator was born
Tenure Year – the year the legislator was first sworn-in the first time
Tenure Day – the day the legislator was first sworn-in the first time
Tenure Month – the month the legislator was first sworn-in the first time
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Age in Days – the age in days between their birth and the date of implication. The
following website is used to calculate days:
http://www.calendarhome.com/cgibin/date2.pl?month1=4&date1=3&year1=1933&wd=Monday&month2=2&date2=8&yea
r2=1933&wd2=Wednesday
Age in Years – age in days/365.25
Tenure in Days – the number of days of experience in days from when the legislator was
first sworn-in and the date they were implicated
Tenure in Years – tenure in days/365.25
Lawyer – scored “1” if the member passed the bar and “0” if not
Real Lawyer – scored “1” if the individual served for 5 or more years as a lawyer or
judge and “0” if not. In the case of lawyers who became judges or state attorneys (district
attorneys, etc), the time spent as a lawyer and time spent in public office will be
combined, as both roles grant the exposure to decorum that this research is attempting to
measure.
Military – scored “1” if they served in the military and “0” otherwise
Military leadership – scored “1” if they reached the rank of lieutenant or its equivalent
(any officer rank) and “0” other wise.
South – If the legislator was from one of the states of the old confederacy the variable is
scored “1” and “0” otherwise.
Party – This research will use the party affiliation on the date of implication (for those
cases where a legislator switched parties). Members of the GOP are scored “1” and
members of the Democratic Party are scored “0.” Third party members were originally
scored “99.” However, third-Party members were eventually included in the parties with
which they caucus.
State Legislature – scored “1” if he or she served as legislator in a state Congress and “0”
if not.
State Legislative Leadership – scored “1” if they served in a leadership position in a state
Congress and “0” if not.
State Legislative Years – the years of experience in a state congress; this variable equals
“0” if they had no state legislative experience
Political Family Membership – scored “1” if the Biographical Directory of the US
Congress mentions some family involvement in politics and “0” otherwise.
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DW-Nominate Score – The legislator’s own personal DW-Nominate score for the
Congress in which the member was implicated. For those with missing values:
Thomas O’Niell’s (D-Mass)scores were missing because as speaker, one does not vote
often enough to develop a score. Score from the 94th Congress is used for cases with
missing values. (-.445)
James Wright’s (D-TX) value from the 99th Congress is used for missing values. (-.444)
Vice President George H.W. Bush’s missing value (1987) is replaced with his
presidential score from 1989 (101st Congress). (.64)
Robert Dornan (R-Cali) was removed from the sample in years that he was implicated in
acts of incivility but was not serving in an official capacity (1997).
Marilyn Bouquard is in the DW-Nominate database under her married name, Marilyn
Lloyd (3rd Dist, TN-R), DW-Nominate Score is -.045 in 1990.
Frank Tejeda (D-TX) uses score from 104th Congress, as there was no score for 105th.
Virgil Chapman (D-KY) uses score from 81st Congress, as he passed away during the
82nd and has no score for that session.
Jennings Randolph (D-WV) uses his score from the 86th Congress, as he served only part
of the 85th Congress, and has no score for that session.
Party Score – the median DW-Nominate score for the party that the member belongs to
Ideology 1 – the absolute value of the difference in the member’s DW-Nominate score
and the Party Score for the same Congress
Chamber Score – the Median DW-Nominate score for the chamber for the Congress in
question
Ideology 2 – the absolute value of the difference between the member’s DW-Nominate
Score and the chamber median score for the same Congress
Ideology 3 - percent of the party caucus that has ideology scores more liberal for
Republicans and conservative for Democrats than the person in question. We use the
DW-Nominate score of the person during the year they are implicated or for control the
year that their “partner” was implicated. For example, if a Republican has a DWNominate score of .99, if this is the most conservative Republican in this caucus, and
100% of the caucus is more liberal. Conversely, if the Republican has a DW-Nominate
score of -.35, the member will likely be the most liberal in his party, and have a score of
0. A high value on this variable suggests that the person is an ideologue. A low score
suggests that he or she is generally moderate or (in extreme cases) may be caucusing with
the opposition. Hence, one should expect a positive association with the likelihood of
being implicated in an uncivil act. That is, if we can assume that ideologues are more
likely to be implicated. Some theories suggest that uncivil behavior is not analogous to
ideological extremism. Values are rounded to the third decimal place. For example,
0.4345 becomes 0.435, but 0.4344 is 0.434. If the ten-thousandths place is 5 or greater,
the thousandths place will increase by 1. Exceptionally small values are reported at
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whatever length necessary to give a significant value, defined as one non-zero digit plus
one additional place, rounded according to the above rule.

Leadership – Those serving as Speaker of House, Majority or Minority Leader or Whip,
or President Pro Tem of the Senate will be coded “1”, all others coded “0”
Chamber – Senators are coded “1”, all others “0”. In the case of a member who moved
from on chamber to the other (usually House to Senate), the position held on the day in
question will be used for this variable. Members who were not Senators (delegates from
territories, for example) are also coded “0”. A Vice President implicated in an uncivil act
will be coded “1”, as the Vice President is the tiebreaking vote and presiding officer of
the Senate. No sitting Vice President was selected as part of the control group.
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NOTES
Chapter 1
1

The poll finds very low approval ratings for the president, vice-president, Congress as a whole, and
several prominent individual members of Congress. These findings are indicative of those represented
elsewhere in the popular media, and this article is included here as an example, rather than an exhaustive
list of findings. “President, Vice President, and Congress Continue to Have Very Low Approval Ratings.”
February 14, 2008. http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/president-vice-president-andcongress/n20080214050209990014 (February 25, 2008).

2

See Appendix A. Any entry for which the description reads “disparaged colleague” describes general
demeaning statements about a fellow member of Congress that are of a personal nature. Those reading
“rebuked colleague” refer to statements that become personal and vicious in nature, but are born of a policy
debate. When there was any question as to which term was appropriate, the transgression was considered a
rebuke, giving the individual the benefit of the doubt. While the latter are notably more common, the
former are certainly plentiful. The threat to the well-being of the president and vice-president was a
comment by Jesse Helms, one of the more colorful members of the Senate where incivility is concerned.
See 23 October, 1995, New York Times, A12

3

Schraufnagel (2006) draws a distinction between partisan difference and personal conflict. The former
refers to ideologically-founded disagreement. The latter, simply referred to as incivility, is the sort of
name-calling and grandstanding that one might typically imagine when one hears the term “congressional
incivility.” Appendix A includes copious examples of incivility.
Chapter 2

Defining Incivility
4

A hold is the refusal of unanimous consent in the consideration of a bill. This maneuver
is unique to the Senate. This is often tantamount, at least strategically, to a filibuster, and
those threatening holds rarely have to follow through with an actual objection to
unanimous consent (Evans and Lipinski 2005).

Recruitment
5

Key’s Law (1947) states that stronger candidates will run if the party is strong.

6

As noted later, state legislatures are a primary source of candidates for US Congressional elections. As
such, any effect present in state legislatures will tend to affect the talent pool from which candidates are
drawn

7

One may note that even the framing of our Constitution was the product of a meeting of lawyers and
other elites. While no normative opinion is to be inferred from anything in this writing, changes in this
status quo are at best highly unlikely, and the static nature of this set of potential variables will be
postulated throughout this piece.
8
Herrnson (1989) defines strong candidates as those that not only make it through primaries, but win
general elections as well. This definition is appropriate here as it is in keeping with the goals of a political
party.
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9

Inferences should not be drawn from this finding, as it suffers from selection on the dependent variable.
The reference is included here only to show that many successful candidates are actively recruited by their
parties. No data was available in the piece cited (Kazee and Thornberry 1990) concerning strong
candidates who failed to win an office.
Factors Affecting Incivility

10

Reed’s (1993) work is one of many, and is included here as a single example

11

These works refer to a member of Congress’s actions, in general. The statements therein should
generally be valid for inferences concerning congressional civility, assuming a reasonably attentive public.
Mayhew (1973) notes that most members of Congress imagine that the public is more attentive than it
actually is, so this inference has at least reasonable face validity.
12

Again, the practice of placing “holds” on legislation in the Senate is an exception to this statement.

Chapter 3
13

A complete list of implicated members can be found in Appendix A. This yielded a raw total of 524
implications.

14

Bob Dole is 2nd with 13, and Joseph McCarthy leads the pack with 16. Similar comparisons could be
made between Dole and McCarthy, but Helms and Long having exactly the same count of mentions
strengthens the example.

15

Helms switched parties early in his career, prior to his election to Congress, because of the ideological
difference between himself and the Democratic Party. Huey Long did not
Dependent Variable and Sample Considerations

16

The textbook example of this violation is a Poisson used to predict the number of cigarettes an individual
will smoke in a given day. This will not work if the group contains non-smokers. The control group is, in
essence, analogous.
Control Group
17

These numbers were provided by a layperson with no knowledge of their intended use.

18

By default, STATA excludes casewise, removing cases with the non-modal value in this situation. This
means that if the sample includes no civil members of leadership, then the cases of uncivil leaders are
removed from the analysis. The other option, listwise exclusion, would remove the variable entirely. It
seems likely that the impact of either of these approaches would impact the results more than the
replacement of a handful of control cases.
Variables and Hypotheses
19

E.G., “rebuked colleague”, “interrupted floor speech”, etc.

20

http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp

21

Time between dates, measured in days, was taken from http://www.calendarhome.com/date.shtml and
divided by 365 to get the final figure in years.
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22

Schraufnagel (2006) finds that the ideological distance between the president and the opposition party
impacts the length of time it takes to reach a decision on judicial nominees. Schraufnagel also states, in his
conclusion that ideological conflict can certainly contribute to incivility.
23

Scores range from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative), and tend to follow a bimodal distribution
along party lines. Scores can be found at http://polisci.ucsd.edu/faculty/poole.htm.
Representativeness of the Sample
24

http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf

Chapter 4
25

See Chapter 3 for a complete explanation of these terms, their meanings, and the implications therein

26

Schraufnagel (2006) points to the distance between the opposing party and the president as a predictor of
the time spent debating a judicial nominee. Uslaner acknowledges that in some situations, ideological
difference can lead to a lack of comity. In all fairness, neither piece suggests that ideology is the end-allbe-all on this issue, and these findings agree.
Logistic Regression and Analysis
27

While the classic Downsian argument for centrist candidates is certainly strengthened by these findings,
Downs argues from the point of view of a candidate, not necessarily the party. The parties do not have the
luxury of creating the ideal candidate, but rather must in practice choose between those who make
themselves available.
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